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Anatomy of a Defect: Exploring the
Outer Limits of a Manufacturer's
Liability for Criminally
Tampered Products
INTRODUCTION

The national incidence of crime has been steadily rising during the

last several decades,' and societal reaction to this increasing criminal
activity is spurring a new wave of tort claims unique to the established

principles of civil liability.2

Historically, individuals who suffered

harm from criminal activity were relegated to seeking recovery from
either state sponsored compensation programs 3 or the actual malefac-

tor,4 both of which often proved insufficient to compensate the injury.'

Increasingly, however, criminally injured plaintiffs have been launch-

ing innovative judicial attacks upon yet another front in the form of
civil suits against third parties who have in some way contributed to the
1. See Bazyler, The Duty to ProvideAdequate Protection: Landowners'Liabilityfor Failure
to ProtectPatrons/romCriminalAttack, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 727, 727-34 (1979), for a comprehensive
compilation of source material documenting the rising crime rate in the United States. See generally, J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1977).
2. See Comment, Negligence Liabilityforthe CriminalActs ofAnother, 15 J. MAR. L. REV.
459, 459-60 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as Comment, Criminal4cts]; Comment, California's
Approach to Third-PartyLiabilityfor Criminal Violence, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 535, 535-37 (1980)
[hereinafter referred to as Comment, CaliforniaApproach]; Bazyler, supra note I, at 727-29. See
generally, Carrington, The Crime VictimsLegal.4dvocacy Institute: A Victims'LegalRightsOrganization is Formed in Virginia, 6 VA. B.A.J. 4 (1980); Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation: .4
Wave of the Future? Trial, June 1978, at 40. Third party suits against the government present a
notable example of the increasing spread of liability. See Comment, CriminalActs,supra, at 463,
n.3 1; Comment, Victims' Suits Against Government Entities and Offlcialsfor Reckless Release, 29
Am. U.L. REv. 595, 595-97 (1980).
3. California presently has several means of compensating victims of crime, including restitution and state aid. See generally, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§13959-13969.1 (California's program of
compensation for victims of crime); Comment, CaliforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 535; Laborn, Remediesfor Victims of Crime, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 22 (1970); Schafer, Victims Compensation
and Responsibility, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 55 (1970).
4. Criminals are generally precluded from making victim restitution either because they are
indigent or their earning capacity is reduced by incarceration. See Comment, California Approach, supra note 2, at 544; McAdam, Emerging Issue: An Analysis of Victim Compensation in
America, 8URI. LAW. 346, 347-48 (1976); Schultz, The Violated- A Proposalto Compensate Victims of Violent Crimes, 10 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 238, 243 (1975). Generally speaking, most violent
crimes are not committed by the wealthy. See Comment, Criminal.4cts,supra note 2, at 459, n.4.
Trial attorney F. Lee Bailey has noted; "Violent criminal defendants are generally penniless. You
seldom collect." Beach, Getting Status and Getting Even, Time, Feb. 7, 1983, at 40.
5. See Comment, Calfornia.4pproach,supra note 2, 540-44.
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injury for which compensation is being sought.6 These third party suits
have led to a demonstrable and dynamic increase in civil litigation
whereby injured plaintiffs have sought to ascertain the scope of liabil-

ity, and hence recovery, for the consequences of criminal activity in
society.7 These actions are meeting with considerable and significant
success in the courts.8
Recent societal attention has been focused upon the potential civil

tort liability of manufacturers of products for the harm caused to consumers by the criminal tampering of those products. Several lawsuits
filed in the wake of this modem day tragedy have raised the spectre of

an issue of tort law hitherto unaddressed by the courts: The scope of a
manufacturer's product liability for products that operate to cause consumer injury due to criminal tampering. The twofold purpose of this
comment is (1) to explore the outer parameters of a manufacturer's liability for criminally tampered products by an analysis of the law of
products liability, and (2) to adopt the position that civil liability for
criminally tampered products may be established by resort to the prevailing concepts of products liability. Since there is no decisional law
and scant scholarly commentary with which to support the position
that tort liability exists for criminally tampered products,10 this comment purports to do no more than present an initial approach and general starting point for a theory enabling the imposition of liability. As
Dean Prosser has noted, the law of torts is a battleground of social

theory.II Thus, whether the imposition of tort liability in a given situation is appropriate traditionally has hinged upon, and been justified by,
the seriousness of the dilemma that the liability was called upon to re-

solve.12 The problem of criminally tampered products that make their

6. See infra note 8.
7. See supra note 2; Beach, supra note 4, at 40.
8. See generally Hoyom v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d
851, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978); Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); Dailey v. L.A. Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 470 P.2d 360, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 376 (1970); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968);
O'Harara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977); Grimm v.
Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977); Gaizilli v. Howard
Johnson's Motor Lodge, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Samson v. Saginaw Professional
Bldg., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975); Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
9. See generally Bass & Weisen, Tylenol's Aftermath: Product Liability Implications, 69
A.B.A.J. 287 (1983); Ranii, ObstaclesAboundfor Suits FiledAfterTylenol Deaths, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
18, 1982, at 3; L.A. Daily Journal, Oct. 25, 1982, at 4; Church, Murderby Remote Control, Time,
Oct. 18, 1982, at 16-19; Church, Copycats Are on the Prowl, Time, Nov. 8, 1982, at 27; Note,
CyanideAgain, Time, Jan. 17, 1983, at 18.
10. A products liability decision for criminally tampered products would be a case of first
impression in every state and federal court in the nation.
11. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS, 15 (4th ed. 1971).
12. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 728; PRossER, supra note 11, at 15. Dean Keeton notes that
this allows the judicial process to continue the "creative continuity" necessary to respond to the
ineluctable changes in society and living conditions. See Keeton, Manufacturers'Liability: The
Meaningof "Defect" in the Manufacture andDesign of Products,20 SYRacusE L. REv. 559, 559-60
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way into the marketplace presents an issue of grave and portentous
significance to a society so necessarily dependent on the availability
and safety of a myriad of consumer goods. One of the primary policies
of tort law is the deterrence of socially undesirable behavior, 3 and
criminal product tampering, socially undesirable by definition, should
fall within the general ambit of tort liability.14 Although courts have
been reluctant, historically, to impose liability for the intervening criminal acts of others,"5 this comment will demonstrate that the trend of
the law is to the contrary.' 6 Moreover, California courts have traditionally been sensitive to the problems faced by consumers injured by
defective products in their attempts to establish the evidentiary requirements of a prima facie case of liability.' 7 Several recent instances of
product tampering aptly illustrate the situation in which a cause of action for injury from criminally tampered products would arise.
In October 1982, several bottles of Extra-Strength Tylenol, an overthe-counter pain reliever, were criminally adulterated with doses of cyanide.'" As a result, several persons died after using the product, and
numerous others became ill. Shortly thereafter, the manufacturer of
the product withdrew all remaining Tylenol from the marketplace and
subsequently reintroduced the product in a specially designed tamperresistant package.' 9 Whether the manufacturer of Tylenol will ultimately be held liable cannot be foretold with any degree of accuracy,
however, the elements of a cause of action for injury resulting from a
criminally tampered product have probably been established.20 As
Judge Hand once observed, an entire industry may be in error for unduly lagging in the adoption of new and available technology. 2 ' The
issue of the defendant's liability is one of A's responsibility to C for the
criminally intervening act of B. Specifically, the question becomes
(1969) [hereinafter referred to as Keeton, Meaning ofDefect]. See generally Bohlen, Ffty Years of
Torts, 50 HARV. L. REv. 725 (1937); Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 463 (1962). But compare Dean Pound's admonition that the tendency to call upon the law in
periods of transition and expansion to do more than it was adapted to do often leads to failure. R.
POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 62, 69 (1930).

13. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 734; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 7. But Gf. Klemme, The
EnterpriseLiability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 173-74 (1976).
14. See Bazyler, supra note I, at 734. The author suggests that inasmuch as an individual
will almost always conform his behavior in order to avoid potential tort liability, the imposition of
liability for criminal activity will almost certainly result in less consumer injury and a reduction in
the crime rate. Id. at 734, 747-50. See PROSSER, supra note 11, at 23.
15. See infra notes 192-03 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 70-302 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 9.
19. See supra note 9.
20. See infra notes 39-302 and accompanying text.
21. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
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whether the traditional tools of tort law provide an effective and justifiable remedy for persons injured by products rendered defective
through criminal tampering. This comment will address and explore
the outer limits of a manufacturer's liability for criminally tampered
products in light of general products liability law and California's ostensive judicial predilection and policy for supporting injured consumers in their quest for recovery.2 2 Pursuant to this objective, a brief
discussion of products liability law, entailing a delineation of the strict
liability and negligence bases for recovery, will be set forth as a precursor to the primary analysis of whether criminally tampered products
may be properly designated defective as to design under these two theories of liability. The conceptual and analytical framework of liability
can be viewed as comprising three broad areas of discussion: First, that
a product which incorporates a design inordinately susceptible to criminal tampering may be properly adjudged defective; second, that a
criminally tampered product may constitute the cause of a plaintifis
injury; and third, that consideration of the judicial and public policy
rationales underlying the imposition of product liability for defective
products may support the imposition of liability for criminally tampered products. Specifically, this comment will demonstrate that a
cause of action for strict liability and for negligence exists and may be
justifiably imposed upon manufacturers of criminally tampered products.2 3 Finally, this comment will demonstrate that the judicial and
public policy rationales underlying the doctrine of products liability in
California forcibly mandate consumer recovery for injuries caused by
criminally tampered products.
A.

The Law of ProductsLiability

The collective body of law commonly referred to as products liability
has existed historically as a means of compensating consumers for injuries sustained through the use of defective products.2 4 Since the first
22. See infra notes 70-I00 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 39-302 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980s: "Repose is Not the Destin"' of
Manufacturers,61 N.C.L. REv. 33 (1982); Vandall, "'DesignDefect" in ProductsLiability" Rethink.
ing Negligence and Strict Liabili y, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61 (1982); Calabresi, Product Liabilitr Curse
or Bulwark of Free Enterprise? 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 313 (1978); Green, Strict Liabilint Under
Sections 402-4 and 402B: .4Decade ofLitigation, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1185 (1976); Klemnie, supra
note 13, at 153; Donaher, Piehler, Twerski, & Weinstein, The TechnicalExpertin ProductsLiabilit
Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REv. 1303 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Donaher]; Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Testfor Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Keeton, Meaning of
Defect, supra note 12, at 559; Freedman, "Deect"inthe Product: The Necessary Basisfor Products
Liabiliy in Tort and in Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REV. 323 (1966); Traynor, The Ways andMeanings
of Defective Productsand Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965).
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modem decision over a century ago,25 this adventitious assemblage of
competing doctrines has undergone a significant and dynamic evolution2 6 from which three theories have emerged as the most prevalent
and frequently alleged bases for recovery2 7 -strict liability, negligence,
and warranty. However, numerous authorities have expressly rejected

the notion of warranty in products actions involving physical injury as
beyond the intended scope and efficacy of a justifiable basis for recovery. 28 Moreover, the California Supreme Court has specifically eschewed the utilization of warranty in light of strict liability theory.2 9
25. Historically, the law of products liability initially began with the case of Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). See PROSSER, supra note 11, at 641; Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 25 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Wade,
Liability of Manufacturers].

26. Much of the development of products liability has centered around the massive accident
problems occasioned by the industrial revolution. See Traynor, supra note 24, at 364-65, 376.
Dean Prosser has extensively traced the historical development of products liability doctrine in

Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960)
[hereinafter referred to as Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel], continued in Prosser, The Fallof the
Citadel (Strict Liabilityto the Consumer) [hereinafter referred to as Prosser, Fallof the Citadel], 50
MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966). There may be anywhere from 12 to 29 different theories of products
liability extant in the United States. See Note, ProductsLiability.- Three Theories of Recovery or

Twelve? 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 194 (1981); 72 C.J.S. ProductsLiability §3, at 5 (Supp. 1975). Products
liability actions are increasing almost exponentially: there were 50,000 products actions filed in
1960, and over 1,000,000 filed in 1976. See Dworkin, supra note 24, at 34, n.5.
27. See Keeton,ProductsLiabilityandthe Meaningof Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 36 (1973)

[hereinafter referred to as Keeton, ProductsLiability]; J. ADAMS, ADVANCED TORTS 9 (Rev. ed.
1982); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CircumstancialEvidence §293A, at 77-78 (2d ed. Supp.
1982); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 849 (1973)
[hereinafter referred to as Wade, The Nature of Strict Tort Liability].
28. See, e.g., Vandall, supra note 24, at 71; Wade, The Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra

note 27, at 829; Wade, Liability of Manufacturers,supra note 25, at 6-8; Traynor, supra note 24, at

365-66; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 653; Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel,supra note 26, at 112434; Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, supra note 26, at 800-05; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§402A, comment c (1965). Although the action for warranty was originally tortious in nature,
similar to deceit, it nonetheless developed along contract lines in commercial settings; the original
action was brought on the contract for the economic loss sustained by the buyer because the
product purchased was substandard, and hence not what the buyer had contracted to purchase.

Wade, Liability ofManufacturers,supra note 25, at 5-8; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 634-54. Conse-

quently, the doctrine of warranty in products actions became impregnated with many of the requisites of contract law, such as privity and notice, and the courts were forced to resort to "an infinite
variety of highly ingenious and equally fictitious theories," in order to impose liability. Prosser,
Fallof the Citadel,supra note 26, at 800-01. See Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel,supra note 26,

at 1124-26 for an interesting compilation of these theories. As Dean Prosser noted, "[t]here is no
need to borrow a concept from the contract law of sales; and it is 'only by some violent pounding
and twisting' that warranty can be made to serve the purpose at all. Why talk of it?" Id. at 1134.
29. Seeking to establish that a manufacturer's liability for products is not to be governed by
the law of warranty, but rather by the doctrine of strict liability, the California Supreme Court has
stated that:
Rules defining and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability
for its defective products unless those rules also serve the purpose for which such liability
is imposed.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
701 (1963). This statement makes clear that the only acceptable kind of warranty doctrine in
California is that which operates exactly as strict liability, and does not allow the manufacturer to
define the scope of his own liability for defective products through the abstruse concept of warranty. Id. See Traynor, supra note 24, at 365-66. Several authorities have noted that the concept
of warranty has always existed as a convenient form with which to invoke strict liability ahead of

1177

Pacfc Law Journal/ VoZ 14

The prevailing view apparently supports the proposition that the invo-

cation of the law of warranty in products actions is inappropriate and
confusing to the jury.3" The approach utilized herein, therefore, em-

ploys a dual analysis of liability under the theories of strict liability and
negligence. Finally, the scope of this comment is restricted to a discussion of liability for products rendered defective as to design. 3

The constituent elements of proof in the causes of action of strict
liability and negligence are largely analagous, consisting of a physical
injury caused by a defective product.32 California courts traditionally
have been sensitive to the problems faced by consumers of defective

products in proving defect and causation,33 and it is well-settled that a
plaintiff may establish both the elements of defect and causation by
its time. See PROSSER, supra note 11, at 656-58; 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW.
Torts §809, at 3105 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as WITKIN]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
402A, comment m (1965). See generall), 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697.
30. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. As Justice Traynor observed. "[h]owever
well warranty served in the field of commercial transactions, its invocation in torts to rationalize
compensation for injury also served to frustrate it." Traynor, supra note 24, at 365. Professor
Wade has noted that "[n]ow that strict liability has become the dominant theory ... it is time to
abandon the warranty way of thinking and its terminology just as we have abandoned other 'impedimenta' of the warranty approach.
... Wade, The Natureof Strict Tort Liabilitv, supra note
27, at 834. In their adoption of strict liability, the authors of the Restatement expressly rejected
warranty language as superfluous and likely to prove misleading, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §402A, comment m; (1965); Wade, Liability of Manufacturers, supra note 25, at 10-11.
Thus, since warranty has been relegated to a position not inconsistent with that of strict liability,
supra note 29, it appears that the doctrine of warranty is anachronistic and hence cannot be utilized to accomplish anything in the area of products liability that strict liability cannot effectuate.
As one court noted at 1913: "The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend
upon the intricacies of the law of sales." Mazetti v. Armour, 75 Wash. 622, 627, 135 P. 633, 636
(1913). But cf. Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975) (wherein
the court held that the plaintiff could recover, concurrently, as a matter of law, under the theories
of strict liability, breach of warranty, and misrepresentation).
31. Generally, a plaintiff may allege that a product is defective as to design, manufacture, or
failure to warn. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413-28, 573 P.2d 443-53, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225-35 (1978); J. ADAMS, ADVANCED TORTS 191-211 (Rev. ed. 1982). See generalI;' Phillips, The
Standardfor Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 CIN. L. REv. 101 (1977), Unfotunately, considerations of defect as to manufacture or failure to warn are beyond the scope of
this comment.
32. See Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 387, 482 P.2d 681, 686, 93 Cal. Rptr.
769, 774 (1971); WITKIN, supra note 29, §812, at 3108-09; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 671. The
similarity of proof is particularly important in design defect actions; thus, the quantum of proof
necessary to establish strict liability for defective design is often sufficient to show negligence on
the part of the manufacturer. See Wade, The Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 83641. Seegenerally Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974). Consequently, California
courts have held that when the plaintiffs cause of action is based on two or more theories of
products liability, the claims may merge into a single cause of action inasmuch as each allegation
seeks damages for physical injury caused by defectively designed products. See Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1972); WITKIN, supra
note 29, §812, at 3108-09. Moreover, California law does not require the plaintiff to elect one
theory of liability in order to recover. See 4 Cal. 3d 379, 387, 482 P.2d 681, 686, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769,
774.
33. See Dimond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 183, 134 Cal. Rptr. 895, 90102 (1976). See generally Campbell v. G.M. Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr, 891
(1982).
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resort to the use of circumstantial evidence, as direct evidence is frequently impossible in many products actions.34 As a result, the use of

expert testimony is often employed by plaintiffs in order to establish
the circumstantial foundation for their cause of action,35 and the technical expert may play a pivotal role in the eventual outcome of a products action.36 Coterminous with this consideration is California's
judicial predilection to favor consumers injured by defective products

in the establishment of a evidentiary basis for products liability. 37 Consequently, a plaintiff injured by a criminally tampered product should
be afforded considerable latitude in the presentation of evidence tend-

ing to support a bona fide claim of injury. 38 Next, this comment will

demonstrate that a manufacturer may be strictly liable for injuries re-

sulting from criminally tampered products.
THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT

The classical definition of the doctrine of strict liability for products
has been enunciated by the California Supreme Court in the landmark
opinion of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Incorporated39 as follows: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. ...."4 Under California law, a plaintiff satisfies the burden of
proof required by this formulation once he presents evidence of a defect in the product, and that the defect was a proximate cause of the

resulting injury.4 ' The indispensable precondition of the strict liability
34. See 32 Cal. 3d 112, 122-23, 649 P.2d 224, 230-31, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 896-98 (1982);
Elmore v. American Motors Co., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 583-84, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 655
(1969); 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 183, 134 Cal. Rptr. 895, 901-02; WITrKIN,supra note 29, §833, at 3128.
35. See Prosser, Fallofthe Citadel,supra note 26, at 840-41; Freedman, supra note 24, at 32526. See generally Endicott v. Nissan Motors Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1977);
Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969).
36. See Donaher, supra note 24, at 1309-27; Keeton, supra note 12, at 563-65; Freedman,
supra note 24, at 325-26. See generaly Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951);
Putenson v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970); Weinstein, Twerski,
Pieler & Donaher, ProductsLiability: An Interactionof Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REv. 425
(1974). Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 651 (1981). Although not all cases require expert testimony, Campbell v. G.M. Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 124-25, 649 P.2d 224, 231-32, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 898-99 (1982),
the courts continue to accord great deference to expert opinion in products actions. See generally
id.; Buccery v. G.M. Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976).
37. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
39. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). This was the first judicial decision
to expressly adopt the principles of strict liability in tort.
40. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d
413, 427, 573 P.2d 443, 452, 143 Cal. Rptr., 225, 234 (1978); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.
3d 121, 130-31, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 439 (1972); Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 260-61, 391 P.2d 168, 170, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898 (1964).
41. See 20 Cal. 3d 413, 427, 573 P.2d 443,452, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 234; 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133-34,
501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442; McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005,

1179

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 14

cause of action is the existence of a defect inherent in the product.4 2

The primary focus in a strict liability action, therefore, is on the product itself, and not on the manufacturer's fault or negligence in the production or marketing of the product.4 3 In short, the plaintiff is not

required to inpugn the manufacturer, but rather, to impugn the product.44 Consequently, the judicial trend since the Greenman decision has

been away from fault or negligence as the governing principle for lia-

bility in products actions.4 5 Rather, the California courts have increasingly relied upon the relative flexibility of strict liability theory in order

to eliminate any existing barriers to an injured consumer's recovery for
defective products.4 6
A.

Strict Liability is a Doctrine of JudicialPolicy
Traditionally, strict liability was adopted because the demands of

public policy required that responsibility for defective products be fixed
wherever it would most effectively reduce the dangers to consumers
1013, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694, 699 (1978); Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 715, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 745, 748 (1976).
42. See Miller v. Los Angeles Co. Flood Control Dist., 8 Cal. 3d 689, 703, 505 P.2d 193, 20203, 106 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10-11 (1973); Vandall, supra note 24, at 72; Calabresi & Hirschoff,supra note
24, at 1061; Freedman, supra note 24, at 323-27. Professor Wade suggests that the phrase "not
duly safe" is preferable to the term defective, Wade, The Natureof Strict Tort Liability,supra note
27, at 833; Justice Traynor would impose liability whenever there is something "wrong" with the
product. TRAYNOR, supra note 24, at 366. See 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 236.
43. See 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418, 573 P.2d 443, 446-47, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228-29; Ault v. Int'l
Harvester, 13 Cal. 3d 113, 121, 528 P.2d 1148, 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1974); 82 Cal. App.
3d 1005, 1013-14, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694, 699; Wade, Liability fManufacturers, supra note 25, at 13.
But cf. Horn v. G.M. Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 373-74, 551 P.2d 398, 405-06, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 85-86
(1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); Lascher, Strict Liabiliy in Tortfor Defective Products.- The Road To
and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30,passim (1965). These authorities, among others,
claim that strict liability is in fact a doctrine of fault, since the plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer erred in marketing a defective product. Such views are, at best, disparate, as California
law makes clear that the only fault in a strict liability action is directed at the product.
44. Keeton, Products Liability, supra note 27, at 33. See 20 Cal. 3d 413, 425, 573 P.2d 443,
457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229.
45. See 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434-35, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978); Smith v.
Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied 412 U.S. 939 (1973);
Vandall, supra note 24, at 63-64; Donaher, supra note 24, at 1307; Klemme, supra note 13, at 15354; Traynor, supra note 24, at 375; Keeton, supra note 27, at 33. See generally Peck, Negligence
and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225 (1971); Wade, The Continuing
Development of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARK. L. REv. 233 (1968).
46. See infra notes 75-93 and accompanying text. See PROSSER, supra note 11, at 644; Wade,
The Nature ofStrict Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 834. The vast majority of states have now
adopted strict liability for products by either decisional law or statute. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 130-31, 501 P.2d 1153, 1160, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 440 (1972); PROSSER, supra
note 11, at 657-58; Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3d 1057 (1967 & Supp. 1975). Dean Prosser has referred to
the national adoption of strict liability as the "most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of
an established rule in the entire history of the law of torts." Prosser, Failof the Citadel,supra note
26, at 793-94. The Dean's hyperbole notwithstanding, many authorities now tout strict liability as
the superior basis for recovery in products actions. See generally Vandall, supra note 24, at 61;
Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Torts, 85 HARV. L. RE. 537 (1972); Epstein, A Theory of Strct
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 24, at 1055.
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that result when such products reach the marketplace. 47 Thus, the pri-

mary purpose of strict liability is "to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that

put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves. 4 8 Concurrent with this primary consideration, California courts generally consider three additional policy rationales when determining whether the imposition of
strict liability is justified: 1) Recognizing the problems of proof inher-

ent in negligence and warranty actions,4 9 strict liability should operate
to relieve an injured plaintiff of any onerous evidentiary burdens in

order to allow the plaintiff a greater chance to recover;5" 2) Fixing liability without fault upon manufacturers should result in an economic

incentive to improve product design and create safer products in gen47. Justice Traynor eloquently defined this policy in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) as follows:
[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market.
It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the
recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time
or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one,
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing
of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless
find their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for
whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent
in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market. However
intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazaradly they make strike, the
risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there
should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best suited to afford
such protection.
Id. at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 440-41. See Traynor, supra note 24, at 366.
48. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963). See Campbell v. G.M. Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 122, 649 P.2d 224, 230, 184
Cal. Rptr. 891, 987 (1982); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 46 P.2d 722, 725, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178, 181 (1970). See generally Elmore v. American Motors Co., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436; McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d
1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978).
49. See infra note 50. As Professor Wade has noted,
[i]t is often difficult, or even impossible, to prove negligence on the part of the manufacturer or supplier. True, res ipsa loquitur often comes to the aid of the injured party. But
it is normally regarded as a form of circumstantial evidence, and this means that there
must be a logical inference of negligence which is sufficiently strong to let the case go to
the jury. This is often not present, and strict liability eliminates the need of the proof.
WADE, The Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 826.
50. See 32 Cal. 3d 112, 119, 649 P.2d 224, 228, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 895; Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978); 24 Cal. 2d 453, 46162, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41; Wade, The Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 826. As the
California Supreme Court in Cronin noted,
the very purpose of our pioneering effects in this field was to relieve the plaintiff from
problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence.., and warranty... remedies, and
thereby "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturer .. "
8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442.
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eral, thereby reducing the risk of serious consumer injury;5 ' and
3) Recognizing that the manufacturer may be best able to absorb and

spread the cost of injuries from defective products by obtaining insurance and distributing this expense to the public as a cost of doing business, the risk of loss should be shifted onto the manufacturer as the
52

party in the best economic position to bear the financial burden.
Generally, shifting the onus of liability for defective products onto the
manufacturer who produced those products is the most efficacious
means of compensating injured consumers.53 Products that are defec-

tive as to design present the most conceptually difficult area of the strict
liability cause of action.
B.

Defective Design Under Strict Liability

Recognizing the problems inherent in giving meaning and substance
to the concept of defect,5 4 particularly in design cases,55 the California
51. See 32 Cal. 3d 112, 122, 649 P.2d 224, 230, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 897; Spradley, Defensive
Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict ProductsLiability, 67 MINN. L. REv. 343, 348-49 (1982);
Keeton, supra note 27, at 34; Traynor, supra note 24, at 366; Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel,
supra note 26, at 1119; Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective
Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 781 (1964). From a practical standpoint, strict liability
should deter the manufacturer from foolhardy business ventures that pose a risk to consumer
safety. See Wade, The Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 826. This incentive policy
may be used to rationalize strict liability even when the design change is a technological impossibility. See Spradley, supra note 51, at 409; Epstein, ProductsLiability: the Searchfor the Middle
Ground, 56 N.C.L. REv. 643, 658-59 (1978).
52. See Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 725-26, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 18182 (1970); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896, 899 (1964); Escola, 24 Cal. 2d 453,462, 150 P.2d 436, 441; Dimond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 183, 134 Cal. Rptr. 895, 902 (1976); Vandall, supra note 24, at 69-79; Keeton,
supra note 27, at 35; Wade, The Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 826; Traynor,
supra note 24, at 366. See generally Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (1965); Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
53. See Calabresi & Hirschoff,supra note 24, at 1057-58; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 492-540;
James, Indemnity, Subrogation,and Contributionand the Efficient Distribution ofAccident Losses,
21 NACCA L.J. 360-61 (1958). The historical justification for loss shifting is based on a premise
of classical economics, and requires that losses traditionally recognized as compensable when
caused by certain businesses ought to be borne by those persons who have some logical relationship with those businesses; thus, no matter where the loss would fall normally, judicial policy
mandates where it shall fall legally. See Klemme, supra note 13, at 158-65; Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 449, 500-06 (1961); James, An
Evaluation of the Fault Concept, 32 TENN. L. REv. 394, 400-01 (1965). But cf. Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict Product Liability: Implicationsof the Theory of Second Best, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 1036 (1980). The theory of shifting the loss onto the party best able to bear it is a
common and consistent theme in tort law. See Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 775 n.20,
478 P.2d 465, 477 n.20, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745, 757 n.20 (1970); Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, 32
N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960); Vandall, supra note 24, at 62-65; Calabresi, supra note 24, at
319.
54. See 20 Cal. 3d 413, 427-29, 573 P.2d 443, 453-54, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 235-36; Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134 n.16, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 n.16
(1972); Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 383, 482 P.2d 681, 684, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769,
772 (1971); Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).
55. The concept of defect is considerably more problematic in the design defect context:
manufacturing defects create an aberrant product that becomes readily identifiable to the consumer, whereas design deficiencies reflect the entire product line and hence cannot be so easily
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Supreme Court set forth an innovative, bifurcated approach for the ascertainment of a defectively designed product in Barker v. Lull Engineering Company. 6 Pursuant to this analysis, a product may be found
defective as to design under either of two alternative tests. 7 First, the
plaintiff may demonstrate that the product failed to perform as safely

as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner.

8

However, the court was critical of

this approach as indicative of only the bare minimal standard with
which a product must comport. 9 Moreover, utilization of ordinary
consumer expectations as the exclusive measure for recovery posed an

additional problem: In many cases the consumer would not know what
to expect as he would have no idea how safe the product could be
made.6" Therefore, the court formulated a second, alternative test:
Even if the product does, in fact, satisfy ordinary consumer expecta-

tions, it may still be found defective if the jury finds that the design of
the product embodies an "excessive preventable danger."' 6 1 A product
embodies an excessive preventable danger if the jury determines, retrospectively, that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design of
the product outweighs the benefits of that design. 62 This risk-benefit
test 63

employs, in essence, a traditional tort balancing of utility against

distinguished. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 453-54, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 235-36 (1978); Keeton, ProductsLiability, supra note 27, at 30-35.
56. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
57. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. See generally Wade, The Nature of Strict
Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 825; Keeton, Meaning of Defect, supra note 12, at 559, for two
alternative formulations of design deficiencies. See also Spradley, supra note 51, at 424.
58. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429-30, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236. This approach, which
is similar to the U.C.C. warranties of fitness and merchantability, reflects in part the warranty
heritage whence California products liability doctrine historically derived. Id. at 429-30, 573 P.2d
at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. Compare id. with U.C.C. §§2-314, 2-315 (1978).
59. The Barker court was critical of this approach insofar as it treated consumer expectations
as a "ceiling" for a manufacturer's liability, rather than as a "floor": consumer expectations are
the lowest standard a product must meet. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 425-26 n.7, 573 P.2d 443, 451 n.7, 143
Cal. Rptr. 224, 233 n.7.
60. See id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 236; Wade, The Nature of Strict Tort
Liability, supra note 27, at 829. From an evidentiary standpoint, the California Supreme Court
has queried as to the potential qualifications a witness must possess before he could be certified as
an expert on the issue of ordinary consumer expectations. Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32
Cal. 3d 112, 127, 649 P.2d 224, 233, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 900 (1982); Schwartz, Forward- UnderstandingProductsLiabiliy, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 435, 480 (1979).
61. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236-37. See Self v. General
Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (1974), wherein the court noted that
"while defective design is an amorphous and elusive concept. . . its contours certainly include the
notion of excessive preventable danger." Id.
62. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236-37. See generally Campbell v. G.M. Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal, Rptr. 891 (1982); McGee v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978).
63. The California Supreme Court was not the first to employ a risk-benefit test to ascertain
the existence of a defective product. See, e.g., Keeton, ProductsLiability: Design Hazardsand the
Meaning of Defect, 10 CUM. L. REv. 293, 313 (1979); Wade, The Nature of Strict Tort Liability,
supra note 27, at 837-38. Apparently, the Barker court found these formulations too inextricably
linked with concepts of negligence to be of any value in California. Compare id. with RESTATE-
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risk,' and appears, therefore, appropriately suited as the superior analysis with which to ascertain defective design with respect to criminally
tampered products.65 Moreover, this second test pragmatically represents the virtual impossibility of eliminating the weighing of competing
considerations from the deliberations of the jury.66
In order to clarify application of the risk-benefit test, and to guide
67
and instruct the jury as to the standard to be applied in a given case,
the Barker court enunciated a series of policy factors to be considered:
viz., the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design; the likelihood that danger would occur; the mechanical feasibility of a safer,
alternative design; the financial cost of an improved design; and the
adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that would result from an alternative design. 68 Thus, by resorting to these relevant
policy factors, a plaintiff injured by a criminally tampered product
must attempt to establish a prima facie case of liability for defective
design under the second prong of the Barker analysis. Finally, the
court held that once the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that
the injury was proximately caused by the product's design by use of the
enumerated factors, the burden of proof then shifts to the defendantmanufacturer to attempt to prove, in light of the same considerations,
that the product was not defective. 69 This comment next will demonstrate that under the second prong of the Barker formulation of defect,
a manufacturer who produces a product that is, by virtue of its design,
inordinately susceptible to criminal tampering may be strictly liable if
that product could have been produced with a safer, alternative design.
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§291-93, 520 (1965) (factors for determining negligence and abnor-

mally dangerous activities, respectively).
64. See generally Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 24, at 1055. One of the reasons for employing a balancing test is that since strict liability is not designed to constitute insurance, infra
note 95, any evaluation of a product's design must necessarily involve the weighing of danger
against utility. See Daly v. G.M. Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 746-47, 575 P.2d 1162, 1174-75, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 393 (1978); Vandall, supra note 24, at 74.
65. See supra notes 101-63 and accompanying text.
66. See 20 Cal. 3d 413, 433, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238.
67. See id.

68. See id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
69. See id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The court found justification for
this action flowing from and implicit in the fundamental policies of strict liability that require a
manufacturer who seeks to escape liability for an injury caused by a defective product to bear the
burden of persuading the jury that the product should not be adjudged defective. Id. The California Supreme Court has long adhered to the principle of shifting burdens whenever it would
effectively accommodate.a plaintiffs cause of action. See generally Sindell v. Abbott Labs. Inc.,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Barker v.
Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel,
3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1
(1948); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).

1184

1983 / Criminaly Tampered Products
UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW A MANUFACTURER MAY BE HELD
STRICTLY LIABLE FOR CRIMINALLY TAMPERED PRODUCTS

Although no court has expressly decided the issue of a manufacturer's strict liability for products rendered defective through criminal
tampering,7" California courts have traditionally and consistently
demonstrated support for consumers injured by defective products.
The continuum of products liability decisions since Greenman forcibly
illustrates California's adherence to the principle that manufacturers
must bear primary responsibility for the consequences of defective
products in society. 7 ' The judiciary has stood pertinaciously at the
vanguard of consumer recovery by expanding existing theories of law
and by formulating new ones whenever necessary to protect the interests of injured plaintiffs. 2 In order to effectuate these policies, the California courts frequently have utilized the relatively extensible nature
of strict liability theory to broaden and expand existing concepts of liability.7 3 Whether strict liability may be imposed for criminally tampered products must be viewed in light of this clear predilection for
consumer recovery at the expense of legal finesse. 74 For example, strict
liability has been interpreted to include not only manufacturing defects, but also design defects, 75 failure to warn defects, 76 and patent defects. California strict liability theory comprehends market share
liability, 78 the application of comparative fault, 79 and a cause of action
70. See supra note 10.

71. See infra notes 75-100 and accompanying text. Justice Traynor has noted:
The cases on products liability are emerging as early chapters of a modem history on
strict liability that will take long in the writing. There is a wealth of analogy yet to be
developed from the exploding bottles of yesteryear, from lathes on the loose, and capricious safety values, and drugs with offside effects. There are meanings for tomorrow to
be drawn from their exceptional behavior.
Traynor, supra note 24, at 376.
72. See infra notes 75-100 and accompanying text. See generaly Note, Continuing Corporate
Existencefor Post-Dissolution Claims.- The Defective ProductsDilemma, 13 PAC. L.J. 1227 (1982);
Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Faultin Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REv. 225 (1971); Wade,
The ContinuingDevelopment of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARK. L. REV. 233 (1968).
73. See infra notes 75-100 and accompanying text.
74. Id. For example, the California Supreme Court justified extending the principles of comparative fault to strict liability because it was "fair to do so. The law consistently seeks to elevate
justice and equity above the exact contours of a mathematical equation." Daly v. G.M. Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978).
75. See generaly Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972). The court noted that a defect could emerge from the mind of a designer as well as
from the hands of a workman. Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
76. See generally Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 157 Cal. Rptr.
142 (1979); Midgly v. S.S. Kresge, Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 67, 127 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1976).
77. See generally Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
78. See generally Sindell v. Abbott Labs. Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
79. See generally Daly v. G.M. Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
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for the infliction of emotional distress."0 Additionally, the California
Supreme Court has assiduously attempted to expurgate all vestiges of
negligence theory from strict liability principles,81 and has extended the
rule of liability not only to actual consumers, but also to any person to
whom an injury is reasonably foreseeable.8 2 Concurrently, the courts

have extended the application of strict liability to successor corporations, 3 retailers,84 bailors and lessors,8 5 wholesalers and distributors, 6
licensors, 7 and sellers of mass produced homes.8 ' In sum, these inexo-

rable extensions of strict liability theory may be taken as illustrative of
California's ability to assimilate new and unique challenges to existing
legal theory by incorporating novel situations within existing principles
of liability. Specifically, these decisions indicate that a strict liability

cause of action for injuries resulting from criminally tampered products
is well within the continuum of products liability decisions.8 9 More-

over, the most compelling aspect of California's judicial inclination to
broaden the scope of strict liability whenever necessary to protect the
interests of injured plaintiffs is the direction of the courts' emphasis:
The decisions have consistently advanced the theories and favored the

policies that would best operate to secure consumer recovery in virtually all instances, irrespective of the novelty of the cause of action. 90 As
a result, the court's inquiry becomes weighted from the beginning in

favor of the injured consumer. 9' Although this hardly constitutes a
neutral balancing of interests, 92 the practical result is that the onus of

liability initially is placed upon the manufacturer, and remains there in
the absence of some egregious consumer fault. 93 Therefore, it appears
80. See generally Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
81. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 441-42 (1972); Wade, the Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 831-32.

82. See generally Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1969); Putenson v. Clay Adams Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970).
83. See generally Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
84. Seegeneraly Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
85. See generally Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
86. See generally Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1968).
87. See generally Garcia v. Hasslett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
88. See generally Kriegler v. Eichlor Homes Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1969).
89. See supra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
90. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 63-64. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs. Inc., 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
91. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 63-64; Calabresi, supra note 24, at 319; Klemme, supra
note 13, at 153.
92. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 63-64. See generally Calabresi, supra note 24, at 319.
93. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 64; Calabresi, supra note 24, at 319. One authority has
suggested that shifting the onus of loss to the manufacturer may compel the consumer, in effect, to
purchase accident insurance for himself through increased prices. See Kalven, Torts: The Quest
for Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 189, 205-06 (1965).
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that a consumer injured by a criminally tampered product may be ac-

corded a considerable degree of latitude not only in the evidentiary
elements of the cause of action, but also in the fundamental premises of
liability that may operate to hasten the consumer's recovery.
An argument may be made, however, that despite the extensible nature of strict liability theory, the cause of action should not be burdened further with an additional basis of recovery grounded upon
harm caused by criminally tampered products. 94 Additionally, there is
the argument that to allow recovery would open floodgates of litigation, and would operate to render the manufacturer a veritable insurer
for his products. 9 In apparent contradiction to these arguments, the
California courts have never eschewed the opportunity to overturn existing precedent in favor of compelling policy rationales that support
consumer recovery. 96 Moreover, shifting the loss onto the manufacturer is the most efficacious means of actually securing consumer recovery.97 In addition, the imposition of liability for criminally tampered
products should promote product safety by encouraging tamper-resistant products.98 Finally, the manufacturer should not be regarded as
an insurer of his products, because liability for any defective product
may not be imposed merely because an injury has occurred; 99 the
plaintiff must always demonstrate that the product was defectively
designed and that the design deficiency was a proximate cause of the
resultant injury."t° This comment next will specifically address the determination of defective design under the second prong of the Barker

analysis.
94. For example, recovery under strict liability theory for solely economic loss and the rendition of services has been denied. See generaly Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d
145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1973).
95. Notwithstanding the inexorable pace of strict liability doctrine, strict liability does not
constitute absolute liability so as to render the manufacturer a veritable insurer of his product.
Authorities for this are legion. See, e.g., Wade, Liability ofManufacturers, supra note 25, at 13-16;
Wade, The Nature o/Strict Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 828; Traynor, supra note 24, at 366-67;
Freedman, supra note 24, at 323. See generally Daly v. General Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 3d 725, 575
P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
96. See supra notes 70-93 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 53.
98. See supra note 51.
99. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 1041-42; Wade, Liability 0/Manufacturers, supra note
25, at 13. Seegenerali Henderson v. Harnishchfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1974); Buccery v. G.M. Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976). Although
an accident-free world may be desirable, the attainment is singularly beyond the scope of the
judiciary. But compare Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936), wherein the court
remarked that nothing but wholesome products could effectively protect consumers from harm.
Id. at 869.
100. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
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A.

Products That Embody an Excessive PreventableDanger of
Criminal TamperingAre Defectively Designed Under The
Second Prong of the Barker Analsis.

The determination of defect for a product rendered defective as to
design through criminal tampering is predicated upon the analysis set
forth in the Barker decision. In applying the second prong of that formulation, the analysis should focus on the adequacy of the product's
design to determine if, on balance and through hindsight, that design
was not as safe as it should have been.' 0 ' The issue may be framed in
the form of a query: Would the plaintiff have been injured if the design of the product had been otherwise? 02 The specific analysis should
hinge, therefore, upon the social utility of the product qua product in
light of alternative means of designing that product; 0 3 if the danger of
criminal tampering inherent in the design of the product outweighs the
social benefits, the product becomes a thing of excessive danger for
which strict liability may be imposed. As a general proposition, any
product designed in a way that causes injury when used in a foreseeable manner becomes defective if that design created an excessive danger that was readily preventable through the employment of existing
technology at a cost consonant with the economic use of the product.'°4
California courts have held that part of the plaintiff's burden of proof
includes evidence of feasible, alternative designs that might have made
the product safer.'05 The crucial issue, therefore, in demonstrating that
a product was inordinately susceptible to criminal tampering is the
plaintiff's ability to establish through the existence of feasible, alternative designs that the manufacturer could have designed a tamper-resistant product."° The plaintiff may attempt to establish this by
utilization of the policy factors enunciated by the Barker court. °7 The
plaintiff may satisfy the first set of factors, the gravity and likelihood of
the danger posed by the challenged design, by demonstrating that the
environment into which the product was marketed requires the neces101. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
102. See Prosser, ProximateCause in California,38 CALIF. L. REv. 369, 382-83 (1950) [hereinafter referred to as Prosser, Proximate Cause]. See generally Campbell v. General Motors Corp.,
32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
103. See Donaher, supra note 24, at 1307.
104. Buccery v. G.M. Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 547, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 614 (1976). See
generally Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Cronin
v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
105. Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 716, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749 (1976); Wade,
The Nature of Strict Tort Liability,supra note 27, at 841; WITKIN, supra note 29, §816, at 3111-12

(citing cases).
106. See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 68.
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sity of a safer design commensurate with the gravity of the danger inherent in that environment.
B.

The DangerousSocial Environment and the "Crashworthiness"
Analogue

California courts have on numerous occasions embraced the concept
of "crashworthiness," or the idea that a manufacturer of certain products must take accidents into consideration when designing those prod-

ucts and employ the design precautions necessary to forestall the risk of
injury. °8 Additionally, since the potential of a second accident is also
within reason, the law now requires that the manufacturer be aware of
some degree of abuse of his product, either by the user or by thirdpar-

ties. 10 9 Although the problem of criminal tampering does not comprise
the issue of use per se, as this relates to the conduct of the plaintiff
rather than to the criminal agency, 110 the concept of "crashworthiness"

presents an illustrative and useful analogy as to the applicability of the
legal reasoning which gave rise to the concept in the first instance. This

comment adopts the position that the application of the conceptualization of crashworthiness with respect to criminally tampered products

may be the most efficient and legally supportable basis for establishing
the necessity for tamper-proof designs. The doctrine of crashworthiness requires that an automobile be designed so as to withstand the

impact not only of an initial collision, but also of a subsequent crash
thereafter."' The reasoning is that automobile accidents, while cer-

tainly not normal occurrences, are nontheless an inescapable component of the environment in which cars are sold. 112

By analogous

reasoning, a logical extension of this principle appears to require all
manufacturers to be aware of the environment in which their product is
to be used, and if a constituent element of that environment involves

the risk of crime in the form of product tampering, to design a product
that is safe against that possibility."I3 The California Court of Appeal14
has already extended the concept to include aircraft manufacturers."

108. See generally Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1976); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972);
McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976); Self v. G.M. Corp., 42 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974) Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 651 (1981); Passwaters v. General
Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th
Cir. 1968).
109. See 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1013, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694, 698. See generally supra note 108.
110. See 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437; 60 Cal. App. 3d 533,
546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 613; WITKN, supra note 29, §835, at 3130-31.
111. See 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1012, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694, 698. See generally supra note 108.
112. See 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437. See generally supra
note 108.
113. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
114. McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1019, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694, 702-03
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Thus, the proposition logically follows that just as automobile and aircraft manufacturers must design their products to be safe within the
chosen marketing environment, so too must other manufacturers design their products to be equally safe within alternate environments.
Further support for this proposition may be found in the judicial recognition of the general danger to be encountered in society.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that the design of
products is not carried out in an industrial vacuum, but rather with the
appropriate and proper realization of the realities of the product's everyday use.115 One of these realities is the ever increasing risk of danger
from multi-varied sources within society. The Barker court took notice
of this fact when it stated that
[t]he technological revolution has created a society that contains dangers to the individual never before contemplated. The individual
must face the threat to life and limb not only from the car on the
street or highway but from a massive array of hazardous mechanisms
and products. This radical change from a comparatively safe, largely
agricultural, society to this industrial unsafe one has been reflected in
the decisions that formerly tied liability to the fault of the tortfeasor
but now are more concerned with the safety of the individual who
suffers the loss.16
This "radical change" includes, among other things, a steadily rising
crime rate, 117 and now, the very considerable danger of product tampering. 18 To paraphrase Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court, however intermittently or haphazardly these incidents of product tampering may occur, the risk of their occurrence is a constant and
a general one, and against such a risk the manufacturer is best suited to
provide general and constant protection.1 9 In summary, there may no
longer be any valid reason why all manufacturers should not be required to be aware of the dangers inherent to the chosen marketplace
for their products, and to provide a general and constant protection to
consumers in the form of tamper-resistant products that are safe for use
within that environment. Next, the plaintiff may attempt to establish
the second set of factors given by the Barker court, the feasibility and
(1978). The appellate court dispatched with the defendant's argument that the concept of
crashworthiness should not be extended to include aircraft manufacturers by stating that "[t]hese
are not legal arguments. They are best left for the Legislature." Id.
115. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 437 (1972).
116. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434-35, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
239 (1978).
117. See supra note 1.
118. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 47.
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financial cost of a safer design and the lack of adverse consequences to

the product and the consumer, by presenting evidence of subsequent
remedial design modifications.
C

Subsequent Remedial Design Modfications May Be Used To
Establish the Existence andFeasibilityof Safer, Alternative
Designs

The evidentiary provisions of the California Evidence Code 2 ° that
preclude the introduction of a manufacturer's subsequent remedial de-

sign modifications or precautions in a negligence case'

do not apply

to an action based on strict liability. 122 Therefore, it is admissible that

the manufacturer changed the method of making the product, altered
the product's design in order to make it safer, or employed existing
safety measures after the injury in question took place. 23 The practical
significance of such a rule of evidence in a products action is that the
rule operates to place the defendant-manufacturer in a no-win position:

The manufacturer must redesign the product in order to prevent future
injuries t 2 and continue the product line, but the reintroduction of the

improved design creates demonstrable evidence not only of the excessive danger inherent in the prior design, but also the feasibility of de-

signing a superior product through the employment of existing
technology. 25 Moreover, it is of no consequence that the manufacturer
complied with the state of the art 26 or the general industry standards
utilized by other manufacturers:' 27 The manufacturer's reasonableness
120. See CAL. EVID. CODE §1151.
121. Evidence of subsequent repairs is generally inadmissable in products actions predicated
upon negligence. See id.
122. See id; Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 119, 528 P.2d 1148, 1151, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 815 (1974); Spradley, supra note 51, at 431-33; B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE 2d,
CircumstantialEvidence §385A, at 146-47 (Supp. 1982). The provisions of the Evidence Code
were designed for cases involving the defendant's negligence or culpable conduct; thus, the exclusion of subsequent remedial repairs is not appropriate in strict liability actions where negligence
or culpability is irrelevant.
123. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. An increasing number of jurisdictions
are now permitting evidence of alternative designs and subsequent modifications in strict liability
actions. See generally Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981); Farner v. Paccar Inc.,
562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977); Calio, S'gn#FcantRecent Developments in ProductsLiability Law, 17
FORUM 112 (1982); Note, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability
Actions: Some Suggestions RegardingFederalRule fEvidence 407,39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1415
(1982); Davis, Evidence of Post Accident Failures, Modfcations, and Design Changes in Products
Liability Litigation, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 792 (1975).
124. As a general proposition, a manufacturer who has taken all reasonable precautions to
correct his error may succeed in absolving himself from potential future liability. See generally
Balido v. Improved Machinery Co., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973).
125. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
126. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-34, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 442 (1972). But cf. Spradley, supra note 51, at 343 passim.
127. See generally Horn v. G.M. Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976);
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433; Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379,
482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971). See also Rexrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674

1191

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 14

in choosing a particular design is not relevant to the determination of
whether that design could have been made safer.' 28 Ostensively, the

very existence of an improved design may be utilized by the plaintiff to
show, comparatively, that the prior design was deficient. 29 Presented
with this kind of evidence, the manufacturer may neither assert that the

plaintiff should have been aware of the improved design,

30

nor claim

1

that the defect was obvious 3'-neither consideration is germane to the
determination of defective design under the second prong of the Barker

test. 132 Clearly, the most topical application of this argument is in relation to the subsequent redesign of Extra-Strength Tylenol.

Subsequent to the criminal tampering of the original product, Tylenol was quickly reintroduced 33 with a vastly improved design that incorporated several safety features specifically designed to prevent
future criminal tampering. 134 Apparently, the plaintiffs who have filed

suit against the manufacturer of Tylenol may argue that the existence
of the improved product design virtually establishes the second set of

relevant policy factors required by Barker.'35 The plaintiffs expert
could testify, by comparative resort to the reparatory design, that safer
alternative designs were, in fact, not only technologically feasible but

also capable of adoption with a minimum of cost and aberration to the
product. 136 Next, the plaintiff may attempt to establish causation by
pointing to the lack of the improved design as a proximate cause of the
injury.
F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1982); Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1982); Halloway v.
J.B. Systems Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1979).
128. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. As a result, the manufacturer may be
strictly liable notwithstanding the fact that he utilized the best design or materials available when
the product was first designed or manufactured. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 74-75; Spradley,
supra note 51, at 417-33; 4 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT
LIABILITY, 91 (1977). This has resulted in legislative modifications of products liability law in
several states. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 74-75.
129. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
131. The California Supreme Court dispensed with the "latent-patent" distinction in strict
liability actions altogether when it held that "[r]equiring the defect to be latent would severely
limit the cases in which the financial burden would be shifted to the manufacturer." Luque v.
McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 144-45, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (1972). See Traynor,
supra note 24, at 371.
132. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
133. The manufacturers of Extra-Strength Tylenol replaced the tampered product with an
improved design within three months. See supra note 9. The California Supreme Court noted in
Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974), that evidence
of subsequent remedial repairs may illustrate the feasibility of the improvement "if the changes
" Id. at 119, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
occur closely in time ..
134. See supra note 9.
135. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text. California courts have held that the product includes the container or packaging thereof, such that it too must be safe. Wade, The Nature of
Strict Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 849. See generally Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc.,
190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961).
136. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.

1192

1983 / Criminally Tampered Products

D.

The Lack of A Safer, Alternative Design May Be Sufficient to
Establish Proximate Causation

Utilization of the Barker analysis requires that the plaintiff present a
prima facie case of causation.137 The plaintiff must present a sufficient
quantum of evidence to allow a jury to find that the defectively
38
designed product was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm.
Once the existence of a defect has been established, it is generally sufficient that the plaintiff show the defective design to have been a substantial factor in causing the injury in order to shift the burden of proof
to the defendant. 139 Frequently, the plaintiff seeks to accomplish this
on the basis of the manufacturer's failure to include a particular safety
precaution in the design of the product.' 40 The plaintiff argues that
had the design of the product been otherwise, he would more probably
than not have escaped injury.'4 1 Several recent decisions may be indicative as to the quantum of evidence necessary to establish the plaintiffs

prima facie case of caustion under Barker with respect to criminally
tampered products.
In Campbell v. General Motors Corporation, 42 the plaintiff was injured when the city bus in which she was traveling made a sharp turn
and hurled her to the ground. The plaintiff alleged that the bus was

defectively designed in that it lacked handrails within reasonable proximity, and that this defect was a proximate cause of the injury.'4 3 The

California Supreme Court, after establishing that the plaintiff need not
disprove every possible alternative explanation of the injury in order to

have the case submitted to the jury,'" held that it was sufficient that the
plaintiff present just enough factual evidence to allow a jury to reasonably infer that had the design of the bus been otherwise, the plaintiff

would probably not have been injured.

45

The court noted that taking

the case from the jury merely because the plaintiff could not conclu137. See Campbell v. G.M. Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 119, 649 P.2d 224, 228, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891,
895 (1982); McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 83 Daily Journal D.A.R. 228, 229 (1982); WITKIN,
supra note 29, §833, at 3128-30. Professor Wade states that the causation element in strict liability
is considerably more narrow than in negligence. Wade, Liability of Manufacturers,supra note 25,
at 22-23.
138. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
139. See 32 Cal. 3d 112, 125, 649 P.2d 224, 232, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 899. See generally Horn v.
G.M. Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); 83 Daily Journal D.A.R. 228.
140. See generaly 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891; Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974); 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104
Cal. Rptr. 443; Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972); Balido
v. Improved Machinery Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972).
141. See supra note 102.
142. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
143. Id. at 116, 649 P.2d at 226, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
144. Id. at 121, 649 P.2d at 229, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
145. Id. at 122, 649 P.2d at 230, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 897. See generally Dimond v. Caterpillar
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sively prove that the existence of a safety precaution would have prevented the injury would allow the manufacturer to prevail upon the
basis of his failure to provide the required safeguard. 146 Moreover, the
court noted that such a holding would be in contravention of the underlying policy rationales of strict liability that favor protection of
otherwise defenseless consumers, spreading the risk, and providing an
products.' 47 Similarly, in
incentive to manufacturers to develop safer
Dimond v. CaterpillarTractor, Company,'4 8 wherein the plaintiff was
unable to establish any direct evidence of a causal link between the
defect and his injury, the appellate court allowed an inference of proximate cause by circumstantial evidence in light of the strict liability policy favoring injured plaintiffs in the area of proof.14 9 If these cases can
be viewed as demonstrative of the general trend of products law with
respect to causation, the courts appear to be relying more on the underlying policies of strict liability and inferences of proximate causation
rather than on complicated evidentiary or causative analyses.' 50 Apparently, the judiciary would have to greatly controvert its holdings to
date in order to deny liability for criminally tampered products on the
basis of causation. Moreover, the jury should in every case be given
the opportunity to decide the social utility of the product as well as the
cause of the injury.
Finally, the whole of the strict liability policies, which forcibly advocates protecting and securing consumer interests,' 5 ' strongly favors jury
resolution whenever the evidence can be interpreted to support the
plaintiff's position.- 2 Thus, once the plaintiff introduces evidence that
he was injured while using a criminally tampered product in a reasonably foreseeable manner, and that the avoidance of harm was frusTractor Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 134 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1976); B. W1TKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE
2d, CircumstantialEvidence §1133, at 1050-51.
146. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 121, 649 P.2d 224, 229, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 896. See generally Haft v.
Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
147. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 121-22, 649 P.2d 224, 229-30, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 896-97. See supra notes
47-53 and accompanying text.
148. 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 134 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1976).
149. Id. at 183, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
150. See supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text. Professor Vandall posits that any proximate cause analysis in strict liability design defect actions is redundant and misleading: Vandall
notes that since the findings of both proximate cause and defective design invoke identical policy
considerations, the social policy issue is asked and answered once the trier of fact ascertains the
existence of a defectively designed product. Vandall, supra note 24, at 75. See Wade, The Nature
of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 27, at 837-41; Green, supra note 24, at 758-59.
151. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
152. See Campbell v. G.M. Corp, 32 Cal. 3d 112, 126, 649 P.2d 224, 230-31, 184 Cal. Rptr.
891, 397-98 (1982); Dimond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 183, 134 Cal. Rptr.
895, 901-02 (1976); Wade, On Product "'DesignDefects" and TheirActionability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
551, 573 (1980); Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 102, at 382-83. See generally Self v. G.M.
Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974); Donahue v. United Artists Corp., 2 Cal. App.
3d 794, 83 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1970).
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trated by the absence of a feasible alternative design, the jury should, in
every case, be given the opportunity to render a decision as to the adequacy of the design of the particular product.15 3 This follows afortiori
when the injury that occurs is precisely the kind of harm that the safety
precaution was designed to prevent.15 4 In addition, automatic jury resolution ameliorates one of the frequent criticisms in design defect cases
that such actions almost invariably emphasize a single aspect of the
product's design, such as lack of a safety precaution, to the exclusion of
all other considerations. 5 5 While it may be true that the litigation of a
lawsuit is a very poor way to design a product, 156 the weighing and
balancing of policy considerations that the jury employs in its determination of defective design necessarily include the societal value of the
product as a whole.' 57
In summary, it may be established that the strict liability cause of
action for products rendered defective through criminal tampering may
succeed. The general policy of the judiciary is to strongly support injured plaintiffs in their quest for relief from the dangers of defective
products, 158 and the underlying policy rationales of strict liability forcibly mandate consumer recovery in virtually every instance in which a
prima facie case may be established.' 5 9 The plaintiff may seek to establish a prima facie case under the second prong of the Barker analysis
by demonstrating the dangerousness of the environment and the
crashworthiness analogue, 60 and by comparative resort to subsequent
design modifications.' 6 1 The plaintiff may demonstrate the causal relation between the defective design and the injury by a circumstantial
showing that existence of an improved design would, more probably
than not, have saved the plaintiff from injury. 1 62 Since the elements of
proof necessary to establish a strict liability cause of action for defec163
tive design may also establish the manufacturer's negligence as well,
an injured plaintiff may proceed on an alternative theory of recovery
153. See 32 Cal. 3d 112, 125-26, 649 P.2d 224, 230-31, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 899.
154. See id.
155. See generally Daly v. G.M. Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978); 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575; Dreisonstak v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066
(4th Cir. 1974).
156. See 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579. See generally Henderson, Judicial
Review ofManufacturers' ConsciousDesign Choices: The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COL. L. REv.
1531 (1973).
157. See 20 Cal. 3d 725, 746-47, 575 P.2d 1162, 174-75, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 392-93; WITKIN,
supra note 29, §816 at 342.
158. See supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 32.
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that considers the manufacturer's failure to design a reasonably safe

product as the basis for liability.
NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS

Although the strict liability cause of action has apparently eclipsed

the field of products liability in recent years, t64 the doctrine of negligence continues to be a viable basis for recovery in products actions:
many attorneys are more familiar with the negligence cause of action,
and evidence of unreasonable behavior frequently results in higher jury

awards.' 65 Since the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Company,166 negligence principles in products actions have remained

relatively constant insofar as the plaintiff is required to present the
same basic case for a product recovery as for a traditional negligence
recovery.1 67 Generally, a plaintiff must allege five constituent elements
in order to establish a prima facie case:168 1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct designed to protect

the plaintiff from an unreasonable risk of harm; 2) a breach of that
duty; 3) the breach as the actual cause of the harm; 4) the breach as the
69
proximate cause of the harm; and 5) actual damages to the plaintiff.
Of these five elements, duty and proximate cause comprise the bulwark

of the negligence analysis; consequently, these two concepts receive the
most attention from the courts, 70 and California decisions frequently
treat both duty and proximate cause as synonomous in many instances. 17

Both elements are linked by the integral concept of

foreseeability.
164. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. Compare Wade, The Nature ofStrict Tort
Liability, supra note 27, at 825 (referring to negligence as a secondary line of attack).
165. See Green, supra note 24, at 1187 n.5, 1187-1213; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 644. See
generally Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 687, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971).
166. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Judge Cardozo successfully overturned the prevailing view of nonliability and set forth the rule that "if the nature of a thing is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril if negligently made, it is then a thing of danger."
Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
167. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
168. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 65-66; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 143-44, 236-50; WITKIN,
supra note 29, §488, at 2749-50. Dean Prosser adds the additional requirement of an act, or failure to act when such is required. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 143-44, 236-50.
169. See eg., Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 342, 345-46, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 797 (1979); Vandall, supra note 24, at 65-66; PROSSER, supra note I1, at 143-44, 236-50;
WITKIN, supra note 29, §488, at 2749-50.
170. Duty and proximate cause receive primary attention from the courts because both issues
may generally constitute threshold questions of law, rather than of fact. See generally Goodman
v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976); Weirum v. R.K.O. General,
Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40,539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975); 88 Cal. App. 3d 343, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796.
171. See Tarasoffv. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 433-34, 555 P.2d 334,
342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14,22 (1976); Tara v. Cal. State Auto Ass'n., 93 Cal. App. 3d 227, 231, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 497, 499 (1979); 88 Cal. App. 3d 342, 347, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798; PROSSER, supra note 11, at
244-45, 325-26.
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A.

Duty, Proximate Cause, and the Concept of Foreseeability
In order to recover for an injury caused by a criminally tampered

product, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant-manufacturer acted unreasonably in designing a product that was inordinately

susceptible to criminal tampering.' 72 Basically, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant was under a duty not to subject the plaintiff to the

risk of criminally tampered products, that the failure to do so constituted the proximate cause of the resulting injury, and that the risk of
criminal tampering was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances.1 73 Although no rigid or definitive rule may be set forth conclusively establishing the existence of a specific duty,17 California courts

have enunciated a series of policy factors which, taken in the aggregate,
may lead a court to conclude that the plaintiff was entitled to protec-

tion. ' 75 These policy considerations are: the foreseeability of harm to
the plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the plaintiff would suffer injury; the closeness of connection between the defendant's act and the
plaintiff's injury; the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
the policy of preventing future harm; the extent of the defendant's bur-

den and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty; and
the availability of insurance.176 Taken in sum, these factors demon-

strate that the ultimate imposition of a specific duty is inherently a
question of policy and judicial fairness with respect to a given factual

situation.' 77 Although an in-depth discussion of the tangled maze of
conflicting themes and theories that constitutes proximate cause is beyond the scope of this comment, 7 8 the traditional imposition of liabil172. See infra notes 268-80 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 235-302 and accompanying text; Note, 24 MINN. L. REV. 666, 670-80
(1941) [hereinafter referred to as Note].
174. See Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 131 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1010-11, 183 Cal. Rptr. 535,
541-42 (1982). Duty is often referred to as the indispensable precondition to liability predicated
upon negligence. See id.; McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal. 2d 295, 298-99, 195 P.2d 783,
785-86 (1948).
175. See infra note 176. Duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum
total ofjudicial policy factors that may eventually give rise to liability. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1968); 131 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1011, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 535, 542-43.
176. See 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23; Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n., 69 Cal. 2d 850, 865, 447 P.2d 609, 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377 (1968);
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968); Valdez
v. J.D. Diffenbaugh Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 494, 507, 124 Cal. Rptr. 467, 475 (1975). Accord, Smith
v. Arbaugh's Restaurant Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 100-02 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939
(1973).
177. See Totton v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc., 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 545, 134
Cal. Rptr. 29, 34 (1976); Comment, CriminalActs, supra note 2, at 427-76; PROSSER, supra note 11,
at 244.
178. Reflective commentary upon the whys and wherefors of proximate causation are legion;
for a good cross-section of the multitudinous array of materials, see generally PROSSER, supra note
11, at 236-90; Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 102, at 369; Green, ProximateCause in Texas
Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. REV. (pts. 1, 2, and 3) 471, 621, 755 (1950); Gregory, Proximate Cause
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ity for causes of action involving criminally intervening acts almost
invariably includes a discussion of proximate causation. 179 Practically,

proximate cause has little to do with causation;180 rather, it is, like the
determination of duty, 8 ' a question of judicial policy whereby the
courts attempt to limit the extent of a defendant's liability and to control the scope of the deliberations of the jury.' 82 Intrinsic to a determination of both duty and proximate cause is the inchoate threat of
foreseeability, which runs through both analyses, albeit in different
83
ways. 1
Of the enumerated policy considerations that will give rise to a specific duty,'8 4 the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is of primary

importance. 8 5 The concept of foreseeability operates within the
framework of a duty analysis to both establish a particular duty, 86 and,
thereafter, to limit the character of that duty by restricting the scope of
the defendant's responsibility with respect to certain kinds of extraordinary injuries. 8 7 Since this second facet of the duty analysis functions
in much the same manner as the proximate cause formulation, 88 it has
in Negligence-4 Retreatfrom 'Rationalization",6 U. CHI. L. REV. 36 (1938); Green, The Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927).
179. See Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 102, at 398. See generally Case Note, 33 TENN.
L. REv. 407 (1966); Freezer & Favour, Intervening Crime andLiabilityforNegligence, 24 MINN. L.
REV. 635 (1940); Note, supra note 173, at 666; Eldridge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding
Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (1937).
180. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 67-69; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 244-45; Prosser, Proximate Cause,supra note 102, at 391-98; WITKIN, supra note 29, §622, at 2904. As Dean Prosser has
noted, California decisional law indicates
that 'proximate cause' covers a multitude of sins, that it is a complex term of highly
uncertain meaning under which other rules, doctrines, and reasons lie buried, and that at
least in many cases there is no real question of causation at all.
PROSSER, supra note 11, at 244-45; Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 102, at 374-75.
181. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
182. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 67; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 236-45; Prosser, Proximate
Cause, supra note 102, at 398; Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN. L.
REv. 19, 22 (1936); WITKIN, supra note 29, §622, at 2904.
183. See infira notes 184-203 and accompanying text. Generally, the prediction of liability
predicated upon negligence requires evidence from which a finding can reasonably be made that
the injury was foreseeable, and that the probable occurrence and seriousness of the harmful consequence were sufficient to require the taking of precautions that the manufacturer did not take in
order to satisfy the standard of reasonableness. See Keeton, ProductsLiabilio,, supra note 27, at
28. Unfortunately, the principle of foreseeability is an elusive and overworked concept, the nebulosity of its definition being exceeded only by the disparity of its application. See Vandall, supra
note 24, at 67-68.
184. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
185. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 147, 577 P.2d 669, 670, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534,
535 (1978); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968);
Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 131 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1013, 183 Cal. Rptr. 535, 543 (1982).
186. See 131 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1012, 183 Cal. Rptr. 535, 543; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 26775; Comment, CriminalActs,supra note 2, at 471-72; see also Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt,
385 F.2d 841, 862 (5th Cir. 1967).
187. The practice of limiting the scope of duty by resort to foreseeability was first established
in the landmark case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
188. Compare supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text (duty) with supra notes 178-182 and
accompanying text (proximate cause).
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been suggested that liability should be predicated upon the sole measure of duty. 8 9 California decisional law in the area of criminally inter-

vening acts tends to support this proposition,9 0 and California courts
have frequently emphasized the existence of a duty as determinative in
cases involving criminal activity.' 9 '
B.

The Law of Intervening Acts

One of the greatest hurdles the plaintiff must overcome in seeking
recovery for an injury caused by a criminally tampered product is the
classification of the criminal intervention as a superseding cause of the
harm. 192 Generally, an intervening act is one that actively operates in
causing the plaintiff's injury after the original act of the defendant has
already occurred. 193 A superseding cause will operate to break the
chain of causation between the original act of the defendant and the
plaintiff's injury by becoming the proximate cause of the resulting
harm and thereby relieving the defendant from liability for the original
189. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 67-68; Green, supra note 24, at 774; PROSSER, supra note
11, at 244-45; Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 102, at 412-13; L. GREEN, THE DUTY PROBLEM IN NEGLIGENCE CASES 755-56, 772-76 (1928).
190. See generally Tarasotf v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971);
Gibson v. Garcia 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp.
Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1969); Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d
213, 157 P.2d 372 (1945); Comment, California 4pproach,supra note 2, at 547; Bazyler, supra note
I, at 737-40.
191. See supra note 190. The ill-fated attempt by the California Supreme Court to impose
"dram shop liability" on tavern owners for the consequences of their inebriated patrons presents
an illustrative example of this policy. See generally Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577
P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128
Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95
Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). Rejecting traditional notions of proximate cause as inapplicable, the court
imposed liability predicated upon an extensive concept of duty. As the California Supreme Court
noted in Vesely, "[t]o
the extent that the common law rule of nonliability is based on concepts of
proximate cause, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the cases that have abandoned the rule." 5
Cal. 3d 153, 163, 486 P.2d 151, 158, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630. Moreover, "[t]he central question in
this case, therefore, is not one of proximate cause, but rather one of duty.
...
Id. at 164, 486
P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631; see Comment, CaliforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 538-40.
Although the Legislature subsequently overturned these decisions, CAL. CIv. CODE §1714(b),(c),
the judicial attempt is nonetheless indicative of the court's ability to stress notions of duty whenever a compelling social policy issue is at stake.
192. Initially, the issue appears to be whether the defendant shall be liable for an injury to
which he has substantially contributed, but for which he may not be liable due to a subsequent
cause of independent origin which actually causes the harm. However, the issue of superseding
causes is essentially a question of whether the defendant Shall be relieved of responsibility; in fact,
the ultimate determination is generally one of judicial policy. Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra
note 102, at 398. See id. at 401; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 270-72, 283; Note, supra note 173, at
407; Freezer & Favour, supra note 179, at 642-49. See generally Eldridge, supra note 179, at 121;
Harper & Kime, The Duty to Controlthe Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §441; PROSSER,supra note 11, at 271; Prosser,
ProximateCause,supranote 102, at 399; WITKIN, supra note 29, §§627-48 at 2909-28. Intervening
acts may be either dependent or independent: the former operates in response or in reaction to the
original actor's conduct, whereas the latter functions from an independent origin not stimulated
by the original actor's conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §441, comment c (1965).
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conduct. 194 The general test as to whether a particular act supersedes is
the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the defendant. 95 Historically,

California courts have been reluctant to impose liability for the results
of criminally intervening acts, 196 citing the relative unforeseeability of

crime in general. 197 However, the modem trend of the law appears to
be to the contrary, 198 and numerous decisions have uniformly rejected

the notion that criminally intervening conduct must automatically cut
off liability for the original conduct.' 99 Rather, the current approach is

that an intervening act will not operate to relieve an otherwise culpable
defendant from liability if the act or risk thereof was reasonably fore-

seeable, 2" irrespective of whether the intervening agency was criminal,

negligent, or innocent."' Thus, California courts have recognized that
194. See Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 131 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1014, 183 Cal. Rptr. 535, 544
(1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §,440-442 (1965); Note, supra note 173, at 668.
195. See 131 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1014, 183 Cal. Rptr. 535, 544-45; Pappert v. San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co., 137 Cal. App. 3d 205, 210, 186 Cal. Rptr. 847, 850 (1982); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 316-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967); PROSSER, supra note 11, at 270-72, 647-48;
Eldridge, supra note 179, at 125; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§440-447; WITKIN, supra
note 29, §§629-643 at 2910-12, 2922-23. See generally Gill v. Epstein, 62 Cal. 2d 611, 401 P.2d
397, 44 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1965); McEvoy v. American Pool Co., 32 Cal. 2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 (1948).
The foreseeability required is that of risk of harm, not of the particular intervening act; thus, if the
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, he may be liable despite
the fact that he neither foresaw or should have foreseen either the extent of the harm or the precise
manner in which it occurred. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF TORTS §435 (1965); WITKIN, supra
note 29, §629, at 2911-12 (citing cases). See generally Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 Cal. 2d
594, 110 P.2d 1044 (1941); Gibson v. Garcia, 96 Cal. App. 2d 681, 216 P.2d 119 (1950).
196. The approach of older cases was that intervening criminal acts were simply less foreseeable than intervening negligent acts, and therefore to be regarded as superseding causes. See
Comment, CriminalActs, supra note 2, at 464; Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 102, at 369;
WITKIN. supra note 29, §642, at 2921-22. The courts often took refuge in antiquated theories of
law such as the "last human wrongdoer" rule, and other vestiges of anachronistic jurisprudence.
See Comment, CriminalActs,suyra note 2, at 464; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 247; Eldridge, supra
note 179, at 124. See, e.g., Stasilat v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 8 Cal. 2d 631, 67 P.2d 678 (1937); Hale
v. Pac. Tel. & Tel Co., 42 Cal. App. 55, 183 P. 280 (1919).
197. See generally Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); Kane v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 98 Cal. App. 3d 350, 159 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1979); Brooker v. El Encino Co.,
216 Cal. App. 2d 598, 31 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1963); Holder v. Reber, 146 Cal. App. 2d 557, 304 P.2d 204
(1956).
198. The view that a criminally intervening act is ipsofacto a superseding cause has been
rejected by California courts as an illogical and undesirable formula. Authorities point out that in
many instances the very reason why the defendant is negligent is that his conduct creates the risk
of criminal intervention, and it is, therefore, absurd to invoke the very fact that established culpability in order to absolve the defendant from negligence. See infra notes 283-297 and accompanying text; Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 102, at 398-408; Harper & Kime, supra note 192, at
898; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§440-449 (1965); WITKIN, spra note 29, § 643 at 292223.
199. See generally Tarasoffv. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 93 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971);
Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976); Schwartz v. Helms
Bakery Ltd, 67 Cal. 2d 232, 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1967); McEvoy v. American Pool Co.,
32 Cal. 2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 (1948); Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 157 P.2d 372
(1945); Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955); Campodonico v. State Auto
Parks, 10 Cal. App. 3d 803, 89 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1970); Gibson v. Garcia, 96 Cal. App. 2d 681, 216
P.2d 119 (1950); Terrell v. Key Systems, 69 Cal. App. 2d 682, 159 P.2d 704 (1945); supra note 8.
200. See supra note 195.
201. Freezer & Favour, supra note 179, at 639-42; Eldridge, supra note 179, at 125-33; Harper
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criminal activity is to be expected in many instances, 20 2 and decisional
law is replete with cases imposing liability for the criminally intervening conduct of others.2 0 3 Next, this comment will address the two
broad areas of law with which to establish a manufacturer's duty to
protect consumers from criminally tampered products: The establish-

ment of special relationships and the general policy considerations underlying the concept of duty.
2 °4
C. Negligence Liabilityfor CriminalActivity

Generally, negligence liability for criminally intervening activity has

been premised upon the breach of a duty arising from either various
"special relationships" formed between the plaintiff and the defend-

ant, 0 5 or from the general policy considerations underlying the concept

of duty."° s The determination as a matter of law that no duty existed is
particularly common in cases involving a defendant's responsibility for
criminal acts.20 7 Therefore, the establishment of a duty to protect consumers from the risk of product tampering at the outset is of critical
importance in attempting to present the case to the jury. First, the
plaintiff may allege that there exists a special relationship between him-

self and the defendant.
L

Special Relationships That Give Rise to a Duty

There is no duty at common law to anticipate the criminal acts of
others.20 8 Generally, the reasonable person may assume that most people will obey the criminal law, 20 9 and is, therefore, under no corre& Kime, supra note 192, at 898; Bohlen, supra note 12, at 1229; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§302B, 442A, 447-449 (1965); WITKIN, supra note 29, §643, at 2922-23 (citing cases).
202. See supra note 199.
203. See supra note 199.
204. Dean Freezer has posed the issue of a defendant's liability for intervening criminal acts
as follows: "Shall one who by his negligence has set a stage upon which a third person commits a
crime be responsible to the person suffering loss or injury from the crime?" Freezer & Favour,
supra note 179, at 637.
205. See infra notes 208-230 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
207. Bigbce v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 131 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1010, 183 Cal. Rptr. 535, 545 (1982).
208. See Tarasoffv. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976); Comment, CriminalActs,supra note 2, at 462-65; Bazyler, supra note
1, at 735; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 173-76, 340-41; Harper & Kime, supra note 192, at 887
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §315 (1965). The common law rule derived from the historical distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance and the equally traditional reluctance by the
courts to impose liability for the latter, thus, one may watch another drawn with impunity.
Harper & Kime, supra note 192, at 887. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435 n.5, 551 P.2d 334, 343 n.5, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 23 n.5. Comment, CriminalActs, supra note 2, at 467; Bazyler, supra note I, at 735;
PROSSER, supra note 11, at 339-40; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §315 (1965). See generally
Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217 (1908).
209. See Comment, CriminalActs, supra note 2, at 464-66; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 173-76,
340-41.
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210
sponding duty to protect others against the risk of criminal conduct.
As a result, the law has traditionally carved out a series of exceptions,

or special relationships, the breach of which may give rise to liability
for negligence. 2 1' These relationships are generally predicated upon
the element of control or influence inherent in the relationship which
the defendant occupies with respect to the plaintiff.21 2 The Restatement
(Second)of Torts (hereinafter referred to as the Restatement) has classi-

fied several relationships as special in this regard,2 13 and this comment
submits that the entire issue of a manufacturer's liability for criminally
intervening acts may be particularly suited to the special relationship

analysis.21 4 Utilizing the rules set forth in Sections 315,15 302B, z t6
449,217 and 448,218 California courts have established both duty and
210. See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
211. See Tarasoffv. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434-35, 551 P.2d 334,
342-43, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14,22-23 (1976); Comment, CriminalActs, supra note 2, at 462-63; Bazyler,
supra note 1, at 734-36; Comment, CaliforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 545-52. See generall,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§314-320 (1965).
212. See Comment, CriminalActs, supra note 2, at 468; Bazyler, supra note I, at 736; Comment, Caif/ornia Approach, supra note 2, at 549-50; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §320
(1965).
213. See general RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§302B (1965), comment e; 314(a), 315,
320. The RESTATEMENT specifically recognizes that there may be additional relationships not
enumerated therein. Id. §314(a).
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §302 (1965) comment m; Note, supra note 173, at
671-79. California courts have fully accepted the principles of causation as set forth by the Restatement. See, e.g., McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal. 2d 295, 298-99, 195 P.2d 783, 786
(1948); Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 863-64, 362 P.2d 345, 348-49, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 524-25
(1961); Pappert v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 137 Cal. App. 3d 205, 210, 186 Cal. Rptr. 847, 850
(1982).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §315 (1965) is as follows:
There is no duty to so control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless,
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a
duty upon the actor to control the third perion's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other
the right of protection.
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §302B (1965) is as follows:
An act or omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third
person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal.
217.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §449 (1965) is as follows:

If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one
of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent,
intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for the
harm caused thereby.
The authors of the RESTATEMENT suggest that sections 302B and 449 be read in conjunction so as
to give rise to the following rule:
[Tihe mere possibility or even likelihood that there may exist intentional or criminal
misconduct is not in all cases sufficient to characterize the actor's conduct as negligence.
It is only where the actor is under a duty to the other, because of some relation between
them, to protect him against such misconduct, or where the actor has undertaken the
obligation of doing so, or his conduct has created or increased the risk of harm through
the misconduct, that he becomes negligent.
Id. §449 comment a.
218. RESTATEMENT Section 448 provides that an individual's criminal act does not constitute a
superseding cause under sections 302B and 449:
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proximate cause for injuries occasioned by criminal conduct. 2 19 The
sum of these rules, which generally presuppose some kind of special
relationship between the parties, 22 0 create duties and establish breaches

for failure to protect plaintiffs from reasonably foreseeable risks of
crime brought about by the defendant's original conduct. 22 1 Basically,
the Restatement approach posits that if the likelihood that a third party
will act in a criminal manner is one of the hazards that renders the
defendant's conduct negligent in the first instance, any resulting injury

caused by the intervening criminal act will not relieve the defendant
222
from liability.
California courts have expanded the litany of special relationships,
and have found liability for criminal acts to exist with respect to common carriers,2 23 innkeepers,2 24 landlords,22 5 psychotherapists, 226 hospitals, 227 schools, 2 28 and parole boards.229 Moreover, the California
Supreme Court recently suggested that the appropriate analysis with

which to establish a duty to protect another from criminal activity is
not by rejecting the common law rule of nonliability, but rather "by
expanding the list of special relationshps which will justify departure
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding
cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct
created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such a
tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have
realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third person

might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
219. See supra note 199.
220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §449 comment a (1965).

221. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text. Not all authorities have been enamored
with the RESTATEMENT approach. Dean Freezer noted that "[t]aking the whole title on superseding cause as it appears in the Restatement, the reader is left in greater confusion than if he had not
read it." Freezer & Favour, supra note 179, at 644.
223. See generally Terrell v. Key Systems, 69 Cal. App. 2d 682, 159 P.2d 704 (1945); Comment, CriminalActs,supra note 2, at 462-63; Comment, CalfforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 545;

Bazyler, supra note 1, at 735-36. See also Hanback v. Seaboard Coastline Ry., 396 F. Supp. 80
(D.S.C. 1975); Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947).
224. See generally Kingen v. Weyant, 148 Cal. App. 2d 656, 307 P.2d 369 (1957); Comment,
Criminal Acts, supra note 2, at 462-63; Comment, California Approach, supra note 2, at 545;

Bazyler, supra note I, at 735-36; Garzilli v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, 419 F. Supp. 1210
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); Toblin v. Slutsky, 506 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1974).
225. See generally O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr.
487 (1977); Comment, CriminalActs, supra note 2, at 462-63; Comment, Calfornia Approach,

supra note 2, at 545; Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969).
226. See generally Tarasoffv. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); Comment, CalforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 545.
227. See generally Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp. & Med. Center, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193,
62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967); Comment, Calfornia Approach, supra note 2, at 545.

228. See generaly Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851,
150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978); Dailey v. L.A. Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 470 P.2d 360, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 376 (1970); Comment, CalforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 545; Bazyler, supra note 1, at
735-36; McLeod v. Grant County School Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953).
229. See generally Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 353, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968);
Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 342, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1979); Comment, CaliforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 545.
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from that rule."23 Thus, the court has explicitly left open the possibility of finding additional special relationships when necessary. The underlying policy considerations of duty may also give rise to a specific
duty to protect against criminal activity.
General Considerationsof Policy as Establishing The Existence
of a SpecYc Duty

2

Although the California courts have suggested that expanding the
special relationship rubric may be an appropriate means of establishing
liability in the area of intervening criminal conduct,23 I decisional law
indicates that liability for criminal acts has traditionally been predicated upon the general duty of reasonable care and foreseeability of
harm under the circumstances.2 32 This approach utilizes the enumerated policy considerations that may give rise to a general duty in order
to create a specific duty of care with respect to the protection of innocent plaintiffs from the risk of criminal conduct.23 3
In summary, the crucial element of the existence of a duty may be
established through either the special relationship doctrine or the policy considerations underlying the general concept of duty.2 34 Next, this
comment will demonstrate that both these indicia of duty may give rise
to a specific duty to protect consumers from harm caused by criminally
tampered products.

A

MANUFACTURER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER NEGLIGENCE THEORY
FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY CRIMINALLY TAMPERED

PRODUCTS

Specifically, in order to hold a manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from a criminally tampered product, the plaintiff should establish
that 1) the manufacturer was under a specific duty to protect the plaintiff from injury caused by criminal tampering, 2) the manufacturer
breached this duty by his failure to produce and design a product that
230.
n.5, 131
231.
232.

See Tarasoffv. The Regent of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435 n.5, 551 P.2d 334, 343
Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 n.5 (1978); Comment, CaliforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 551.
See supra note 230.
See 17 Cal. 3d 425,434-39, 551 P.2d 334, 343-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23-28; 88 Cal. 3d 342,

348-49, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798-99; Comment, CalforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 547-49;

Bazyler, supra note 1, at 737-40. The California Supreme Court noted in Tarasoff that in each
case the sufficiency of the defendant's conduct was to be "measured against the traditional negligence standard of the rendition of reasonable care under the circumstances." 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439,
551 P.2d 334, 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25. See generalo Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443
P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
233. See 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22; O'Hara v. Western
Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 804, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 490 (1977); Vandall, supra note
24, at 67-68; Comment, CaliforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 547-48.
234. See supra notes 205-33 and accompanying text.
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included reasonably necessary safety precautions, and 3) the intervention of criminal tampering did not constitute a superseding cause that
could foreclose the defendant's liability.2 35 Although California courts
have traditionally relied upon the rule set forth in the Restatement 36 as
indicative of a manufacturer's general duty with respect to potentially
dangerous products, 237 this rule does no more than supply a loose definitional framework of liability. Moreover, it adds little to an appropriate analysis by which it may be said that the manufacturer's duty
includes protecting consumers against criminally tampered products.
Rather, the plaintiff should seek to establish and premise this specific
duty upon either the special relationship doctrine or the general policy
considerations underlying the concept of duty. First, this comment will
demonstrate the special relationship that may exist between manufacturers and consumers.
A.

The Manufacturer Occupies a Special Relationshp With the
Consumer
The authors of the Restatement have stated that a manufacturer of

products undertakes a "special responsibility" toward all members of
the consuming public that could be injured by those products. 238 Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court observed in 1944 that the

relationship between manufacturers and consumers was not as it once
was, noting that the consumer's erstwhile vigilance was being lulled by

the incessant efforts of the manufacturer to build up trust and confidence in the manufacturer's product.2 39 Thus, the consumer was no

longer able to investigate for himself the safety of a product, but was
forced to rely upon the reputation of the manufacturer.2 40 This led
Justice Traynor to state that "[t]he manufacturer's obligation to the
235. See supra notes 164-203 and accompanying text.
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §395 (1965) states:
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel
which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of
causing harm to those who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer should expect
it to be used and to those whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use, is
subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and
for a purpose for which it is supplied.
237. See generally Putenson v. Clay Adams Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1970); Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942); Nebelung v. Norman, 14 Cal. 2d
647, 96 P.2d 327 (1939); Kaash v. L.A. Ladder Co., 1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P.2d 481 (1934).
238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment c (1965). Dean Prosser notes
that purveyors of products for human consumption have been under a "special responsibility" to
the consuming public since the year 1266 when the English common law imposed civil liability by
virtue of the "'common custom of the realm."' Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 26,
at 1103.
239. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
240. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment c (1965).
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consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship between
them. ...."I4 An argument may be made that by the incessant efforts
of the manufacturer to influence and control the consumer's purchasing

power with respect to the manufacturer's product, a special relationship
has been established between the manufacturer and the consumer
whom he attempts to control.24 2 Concurrent with this relationship

would exist the duty not to subject the consumer to an unreasonable
risk of danger from criminal product tampering.243 This would be especially true inasmuch as it is the defendant-manufacturer's affirmative
conduct that has created a situation of danger to the consumer by en-

couraging the consumer to purchase a criminallytampered product. 2 "

Logically, once the manufacturer has influenced the consumer to

purchase a particular product, the manufacturer should not be allowed
to assert that his responsibility ended at that point if the proffered product embodied a risk of unreasonable danger from criminal
tampering.2 45
Although there is no specific decisional law expressly adopting the

relationship between a manufacturer and a consumer as special in this
context, the California Supreme Court has stated that expanding the

list of special relationships would be an effective way of protecting the

plaintiffs interests,24 6 especially when failure to do so would result in a

morally insupportable result.2 47 Apparently, there is little justifiable
reason why the special relationship doctrine should not be expanded so
as to include manufacturers and consumers.2 48 Finally, to deny an injured consumer recovery merely because he was unable to establish a
legally recognized special relationship would work exactly the kind of
manifest injustice that the court sought to avoid.2 49 Next, this comment
will demonstrate that the general policy considerations underlying the

concept of duty may give rise to a specific duty to protect consumers
from criminally tampered products.
241. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443.
242. See supra notes 238-241 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that a "dependence-control" approach, based upon the defendant's voluntary assumption of responsibility toward the plaintiff, may present the superior analysis. See Comment, CaliforniaApproach, Fpra
note 2, at 552-57. The author posits that a voluntary and gratituous assumption of responsibility
for the plaintiff may give rise to a concordant duty to protect that person from the risk of harm to
be reasonably expected from the relationship. Id. at 553-54.
243. See supra notes 206-234 and accompanying text.
244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §320 (1965). See supra notes 215-219 and accompanying text.
245. As Dean Green notes, manufacturers should simply be taken at their word. Green, supra
note 24, at 1191. See Vandall, supra note 24, at 76-77.
246. See supra note 230.
247. See Tarasoff v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435 n.5, 551 P.2d 334,
345 n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 n.5 (1976).
248. See supra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
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B.

GeneralPolicy ConsiderationsMay Be Utilized To Establish a
Specyfc Duty to Protect Consumers From Criminally
TamperedProducts

Irrespective of the relationship between the parties, 250 the plaintiff
may argue that the reasonably foreseeable risk of crime in general, and
of product tampering in specific, should give rise to a duty based on
policy considerations not to unreasonably subject consumers to this risk
of harm.25 ' The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is the most important element of the several policy considerations that will, in the
aggregate, give rise to a specific duty; 252 thus, the reasonableness of the
defendant-manufacturer should be measured by the relative foresee253
ability of harm to consumers through product tampering.
The existence of crime in a populous, industralized society is by no
means uncommon. 254 Decisional law indicates that California courts
have never been reticent to impose liability for the consequences of
criminal activity if the occurrence of that activity was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. 255 The ubiquitous cases of automobiles in
which the keys are left in the ignition present both a frequent cause of
litigation and an illustrative analogy with respect to criminally tampered products. Generally, the courts have held that the foreseeable
risk of crime inherent in leaving the keys in an unattended and unlocked automobile was sufficient to give rise to a duty of care to any
person subsequently injured by the thief-driver. 6 In Richardson v.
Ham,2 57 for example, the California Supreme Court held that there
was a reasonably foreseeable risk that the defendant's bulldozers might
be tampered with if left unattended, and imposed liability for the con250. See supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding the viability of finding
an additional special relationship between manufacturers and consumers, California courts have
rejected the notion of relationships between the parties as dispositive of liability in other contexts.
See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 3d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968).
251. Dean Freezer has stated that the question of responsibility for intervening criminal acts
can be distilled into one question: "Is it the policy of this court that a negligent person shall bear
the risk that a third person will take advantage of the opportunity afforded by such negligence to
commit a crime?" Freezer & Favour, supra note 179, at 642.
252. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
253. See Comment, CaliforniaApproach, supra note 2, at 545; Freezer & Favour, supra note
179, at 643.
254. See supra note 1. As the Lord Chancellor noted in 1918, "[c]rime is, indeed, a very serious matter, but everyone knows that crime is not uncommon." London Joint Stock Bank, Ltd. v.
MacMillan & Arthur, 1918 App. Cas. 777, 789, 119 L.T. 387, 34 T.L.R. 509. See Note, supra note
173, at 673 n.25.
255. See supra notes 184-203 and accompanying text.
256. See generally Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964);
Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955); Enders v. Apocoa, Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d
897, 127 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1976); Azcona v. Tibbs, 190 Cal. App. 2d 425, 12 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1961);
WITKIN, supra note 29, §645, at 2924-26.
257. 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955).
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sequent injuries that occurred." 8 Similarly, in Murray v. Wright,25 9 it
was held that the risk of a theft from a used car lot was a matter of
common knowledge in the community, and, therefore, the defendant
came under a specific duty to protect innocent plaintiffs from the resuits of the stolen automobile. 26 0 Although these decisions frequently
place emphasis upon the existence of unique or special circumstances,
such as the neighborhood in which the car was left, 26 t these circum262
stances are not always required. In Enders v. Apcoa, Incorporated,
the court held that the intervening chase of a police car was sufficiently
foreseeable to create a duty to protect the plaintiff from
injury resulting
263
from the thiefs attempt to elude the police officer.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to state with precision or acuity what a
particular court will find to be reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances. 2 4 Until recently, instances of product tampering were
66
scattered and few. 265 With the advent of the Tylenol tamperings,
and the flurry of federal legislative action that followed,2 67 it seems
clear that manufacturers may no longer be able to claim that product
tampering is too unforeseeable to warrant the imposition of liability.
In effect, all manufacturers may be on notice that instances of product
tampering are, henceforth, reasonably foreseeable under all circumstances. Apparently, a manufacturer of products could ignore this very
real and present danger only at the peril of the imposition of liability.
Next, this comment will demonstrate how the manufacturer may
258. Id. at 776, 285 P.2d at 271.

259. 166 Cal. App. 2d 589, 333 P.2d 111 (1958).
260. Id. at 592, 333 P.2d at 113.
261. See, e.g., Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954).
262. 55 Cal. App. 3d 897, 127 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1976).
263. Id. at 905-06, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56.
264. It thus becomes apparent that to attempt to lay down any general rule as to what is
or what is not a foreseeable intervening crime is wholly impracticable if not impossible.
Each case must be decided upon its particular facts, the rule being that if, under the
circumstances, a reasonable man in the position of the defendant would have foreseen
the intervening crime, the defendant may be liable.
Note, supra note 173, at 683. See generally supra notes 184-203 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. But sf. Barowitz, PackagedDeath: Fore.

runnerso/the Tylenol Poisonings,69 A.B.A.J. 282, 282-86 (1983) for an interesting historical perspective of product tampering.
266. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
267. The federal government has already enacted the Product Liability Risk Detention Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949 (1981), which provides for nationwide manufacturers' selfinsurance groups. See Dworkin, supra note 24, at 34 n.9. Several commentators have urged a
nationwide reform of products liability law due to perceived disparate laws and inconsistent results from state to state, id., and further federal legislation is currently being considered that would
drastically alter the law in California by requiring, among other things, that: 1) the plaintiff prove
that the defendant manufactured the allegedly defective product; 2) a presumption of products
safety be established once the product meets federal standards; and 3) the burden of proof be
shifted from manufacturers to consumers. See id.; Calabresi, supra note 24, at 314. This legislation would, if passed, effectively overrule the decisions in Sindell, supra note 78, and Barker, supra
note 56. See Dworkin, supra note 24, at 34 n.9. See generally Calio, supra note 123, at 112.
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breach his duty by designing a product that is not reasonably safe from

product tampering.
THE MANUFACTURER BREACHES His DUTY TO DESIGN A SAFE
PRODUCT IF HE FAILS TO INCLUDE REASONABLY
NECESSARY SAFETY PRECAUTIONS IN THE
DESIGN OF THE PRODUCT

Generally, the extent of a manufacturer's duty is commensurate with
the danger inherent in the forseeable risk of harm that gives rise to the

duty in the first instance.268 Whether the manufacturer can satisfy that
duty may ultimately depend upon his ability "to so design his product
as to make it not accident-proof, but safe for the use for which it was
intended. '269 It is well settled that a manufacturer may breach this
duty by designing a product that fails to include reasonably necessary
safety precautions. 0 The Restatement specifically states that a manufacturer should be subject to liability for his failure to exercise reason-

able care in the adoption of a safe plan or design for the product.27 '

Although what constitutes reasonable care varies with the facts and circumstances of each case, 272 the traditional inquiry employs a balancing
of the likelihood of harm to be expected from a product with a given
design, and the gravity of that harm should it occur, against the burden
of employing the safety precautions that would be effective to avoid the
injury.273 In determining whether the manufacturer has exercised reasonable care in designing a product against criminal tampering, two
general propositions weigh heavily in favor of the consumer. First, the
manufacturer is under the duty of an expert to be aware of the latest
developments in the field, inclusive of all available safety precautions
268. See generally Putenson v. Clay Adams Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1970); Reynolds v. Natural Gas Equipment Inc., 184 Cal. App. 2d 724, 7 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1960).
269. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 470, 467 P.2d 229, 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632
(1970) (quoting Veras v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 258, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737, 747 (1962));
Noel, Manufacturers'Liabilityfor Negligence, 33 TENN. L. REv. 444, 447 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as Noel, LiabilityforNegligence]; Noel, Recent Trends in Aanufacturers'Negligence as to
Design, Instructions,or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 26, 45 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Noel, Recent
Trends]; Prosser, supra note 11, at 644.
270. See generally 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629; 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 737; Darling v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 17 Cal. App. 2d 713, 341 P.2d 23 (1959); Noel,
LiabiliyforNegligence supra note 269, at 454. See also Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 29 F.2d
310 (9th Cir. 1961).
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §398 (1965) states:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous for
the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he should
expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm
caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design.
272. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
273. See 2 Cal. 3d 465, 470, 467 P.2d 229, 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632; 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062,

1077-78, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319, 329; Bazyler, supra note 1, at 751, Keeton, supra note 27, at 28.

1209

Pacic Law Journal/ Vol. 14

which could feasibly be employed." 4 Second, the gravity of harm from
criminal tampering is so egregious that presentation of the case to the
jury may75have a profound impact upon the eventual imposition of
2

liability.

A.

The Manufacturer'sDuty as an Expert Requires That the
Manufacturer Be A ware of Situations Involving the Possibility
of CriminalProduct Tampering

What is not obvious to an ordinary consumer with respect to the
design safety of a given product may be glaringly so to an expert in the
field who is cognizant of all the latest scientific and technological developments. Consequently, the manufacturer is charged with the knowledge and skill of an expert in the field. 276 Thus, the manufacturer's
duty as to design includes all reasonably necessary design precautions
that are consistent with that knowledge, and requires that the design of
the product be consonant with the technological and scientific advances
in the field.277 This includes designing against even obvious dangers, 8
as the patency of danger is germane only to the manufacturer's defenses, and not to whether he has satisfied his duty of reasonable care
as to design.279 Therefore, it is proper to introduce evidence as to the
necessity and feasibility of alternative design choices that would have
enhanced the factor of safety, for the purpose of demonstrating the
manufacturer's failure to exercise reasonable care in the design of the
product.280 Whether the manufacturer should have employed alternative designs may ultimately depend upon how great the jury determines
the gravity of danger to be from criminal product tampering.
B. The Gravity of Injury From CriminalProduct Tampering, is so
Egregious That the ManufacturerMay Always Be
Unreasonablein Not Adopting Safer Designs

Once evidence of any alternative design has been introduced, the
jury must balance the burden to the defendant in employing an alter274. See infra notes 276-80 and accompanying text.
275. See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
276. See Noel, LiabilityforNegligence supra note 269, at 452; Noel, Recent Trends, supra note
269, at 51-53; 42 C.J.S. Products Liability §16, at 25 (Supp. 1975). See generally, Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products, Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 127 (1974);
Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
277. See supra note 276.
278. See 2 Cal. 3d 465, 473-74, 467 P.2d 229, 234-35, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 634-35.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 472, 467 P.2d at 233-34, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 633-34; Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205
Cal. App. 2d 246, 259, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737, 744 (1962); Spradley, supra note 51, at 431. See also
Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973).
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native design against the likelihood of gravity of danger.2" 8 ' Balancing
the risk of injury from criminally tampered products against a manufacturer's financial burden in employing a reasonably necessary design
modification may present a rhetorical question: Given the tragic consequences and egregious manner in which criminally tampered products
affect society, is there any economic burden on the manufacturer that is
sufficiently great so as to force the injured consumer to bear the physical burden of product-caused injury? The argument may be made that
if a manufacturer is unable to produce an economically feasible product due to the necessity of including tamper-resistant designs, then that
manufacturer should produce no product at all. Moreover, production
of the product without safety designs may be tantamount to extremely
unreasonable behavior in the face of the presently foreseeable risk of
product tampering.2 82 Next, this comment will demonstrate that general notions of proximate causation will not relieve the manufacturer of
criminally tampered products from liability.
PROXIMATE CAUSATION WILL NOT OPERATE TO RELIEVE A
MANUFACTURER FROM LIABILITY ONCE DUTY HAS BEEN
ESTABLISHED

Unfortunately, proximate cause analyses tend more to the ingenious
than to the ingenuous, 283 and whenever a plaintiff attempts to establish
liability for criminally intervening activity, the issue of proximate cause
is generally the most formidable hurdle to be overcome.28 4 If the intervening act is designated a superseding cause, the plaintiff fails in his
case for lack of proximate causation.28 5 However, California courts
have abandoned the once restrictive rules of proximate cause for the
relatively flexible concept of duty in determining liability for intervening criminal acts.28 6 Moreover, California decisional law frequently
treats duty and proximate cause as synonomous in cases of criminal
conduct, 287 and cases imposing liability for intervening crimes gener288
ally emphasize the existence of a duty as determinative of liability.
The argument may be made that once the defendant's duty to protect
the plaintiff is established, it should be of no consequence what occurs
281. See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text. See generally, Annot., 95 A.L.R.3d 1066
(1981) (duty of manufacturer to equip product with safety device to protect against a patent or

obvious danger).
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

178-82 and accompanying text.
178-82 and accompanying text.
192-203 and accompanying text.
184-91 and accompanying text.
171-91 and accompanying text.
184-91 and accompanying text.
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in the interim.2 89 Moreover, there is a compelling logic to this proposition: If the reason the defendant may be negligent is that he has failed
to protect the plaintiff from a reasonably foreseeable risk of criminal
product tampering, then it becomes inherently illogical and legally suspect to invoke the very occurrence of criminal tampering in order to
absolve the defendant from liability.2 9 This comment takes the position that when criminal product tampering occurs, it should not be utilized to insulate the manufacturer from liability under an attenuated
proximate cause analysis. Furthermore, it appears unsound in terms of
policy to limit a manufacturer's liability merely because an intervening
criminal act, the very probability of which may have rendered his conduct unreasonable in the first instance, has brought about the expected
harm.29 t
The preferable approach, therefore, in determining which party shall
ultimately bear the loss for criminally tampered products 292 -the negligent defendant or the innocent plaintiff-is to make the dispositive issue that of duty.293 As Dean Prosser has noted, "[a] criminal
intervening act will not relieve the defendant if he was under a duty to
protect the plaintiff against it," 294 and "[o]nce that question is answered
in the affirmative, nothing more remains to be said." 295 Inasmuch as
California decisional law has consistently emphasized the existence of
duty in imposing liability for criminally intervening acts, 2 96 it appears
both legally sound and internally consistent to make a manufacturer's
liability for criminally tampered products dependent upon this same
approach. Dean Prosser has observed that there is a definite tendency
of the courts to avoid entirely any discussion of proximate cause and to
abdicate this troublesome issue to the jury;297 with that premise, this
comment is in complete accord.
In summary, a plaintiff injured by a criminally tampered product
may attempt to establish a manufacturer's duty by demonstrating either
the existence of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the
289. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text; PROSSER, supra note 11, at 271. See generally Freezer & Favour, supra note 179, at 635; Eldridge, supra note 179, at 121; Harper & Kime,
supra note 192, at 886.
290. See supra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
292. See Klemme, supra note 13, at 161; Calabresi, supra note 24, at 500-06; Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 102, at 397. See generally Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478
P.2d 365, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
293. See Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 102, at 401-03. See generallysupra notes 171191 and accompanying text.
294. Prosser, ProximateCause, supra note 102, at 382-83, 403.
295. Id. at 401.
296. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
297. See Prosser, Proximate Cause, supra note 102, at 420.
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manufacturer,2 9 8 or that the general considerations of policy underlying the concept of duty support the imposition of liability. 2 9 9 The manufacturer may be shown to have breached this duty by his failure to
include reasonably necessary safety precautions as indicated by his status as an expert and the gravity of harm to be expected from this failure.3° Finally, it may be demonstrated that the primary concept of
duty should be determinative of the manufacturer's liability for criminally tampered products irrespective of any attenuated proximate causation, 30 1 and that it is inherently logical to support liability for the
32
results of criminally tampered products. 1
CONCLUSION

The cumulative history of California products liability law forcibly
demonstrates that the judiciary will seek to secure and protect the interests of consumers injured by defective products. 0 3 Plaintiffs are allowed broad latitude in the evidentiary elements of a prima facie case
for products liability.3 4 Moreover, California decisional law indicates
that existing theories of liability are sufficiently broad to include new
causes of action for injuries wrought by a changing society. 30 5 This
comment has demonstrated that causes of action for strict liability 3 6
and for negligence 30 7 may exist for harm caused by criminally tampered products. Further, it has been shown that the continuum of
products liability decisions strongly recognizes California's prevailing
judicial policy for supporting plaintiff's injured by defective products,
irrespective of the means by which the harm occurred.308 It has been
submitted that criminally tampered products may now constitute a
constant and general danger to consumers of those products. 30 9 Finally, this comment has demonstrated that the manufacturer must bear
the primary responsibility for the results of criminally tampered products in society,3 10 and that the manufacturer is in the best position to
298. See supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 250-63 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 268-82 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 283-97 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 283-97 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 39-163 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notse 164-302 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 39-100 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 39-100 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 39-100 and accompanying text. Although some 86% of firms subject to
products liability actions carry some form of insurance, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FINAL
REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, 111-2 (1978), the judicial
increase in manufacturers' liability for defective products has led to alarm on several fronts: in-
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provide compensation for the harm resulting from criminally tampered
products.31' In sum, it appears that the California courts that have so
long occupied the vanguard of consumer recovery for defective products would have to undergo a 180-degree about face in order to deny
recovery for criminally tampered products once the basic elements of a
prima facie case have been established.

Kenneth A. Roberts

surers are raising their premiums for product liability insurance by hundreds, sometimes
thousands of percent. See Dworkin, supra note 24, at 34; Note, When the Product Ticks.- Products
Liability and Statutes of Limitations, 11 IND. L. REv. 693, 698-99 (1978). Consequently, many
product manufacturers have difficulty in obtaining liability insurance. See Calabresi, supra note
24, at 313.
311. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. Professor Calabresi has criticized manufacturers for suggesting a crisis in products liability law. Although manufacturers may wish to
shift the loss to consumers, supra note 267, Calabresi posits that this contravenes a basic economic
premise: taking risks is what corporations do best. Calabresi, supra note 24, at 321. See Vandall,
supra note 24, at 77 n.130. See generally Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 24, at 1055.
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